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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL COLLABORATION IN 
THE GOVERNMENT AND NONPROFIT SECTORS 
 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to study the management of public 
and nonprofit resources and financial risk. Governments will be able to use its findings to 
continue to provide public services in collaboration with other sectors, including the 
nonprofit sector. Nonprofit financial self-sufficiency and sub-award grant mechanisms 
between the government and nonprofit sectors are two primary areas to be examined. 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first investigates how the diversification of 
nonprofit revenue portfolios influences extreme revenue risks; the results show that the 
chance of extreme revenue loss increases when revenue sources are highly correlated to 
each other. The second essay examines the impact of strenuous state fiscal conditions on 
nonprofit organizations based in different U.S. states in order to report on generalizable 
empirical research on sub-award grant mechanisms, state and local government grants 
awarded to nonprofit organizations. The third essay explores the nonprofit sector’s 
response to economic shocks, and whether specific state characteristics intensified or 
mitigated the impact of the economic crisis. The findings from this dissertation can help 
nonprofit-sector scholars and practitioners understand different perspectives of market 
risk, revenue risk and portfolio development, and financial stability related to government 
grants.  
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Executive Summary 
 This dissertation consists of three essays related to nonprofit risk management, 
determinants of state grants, and economic crisis management. The findings from this 
dissertation can help nonprofit-sector researchers and managers understand different 
perspectives of (1) market risk, (2) revenue risk and portfolio development, and (3) 
financial stability related to government grants. 
 The first essay— Nonprofit Revenue Strategy and Downside Risk: Applying 
Portfolio Theory and Extreme Value Theory—investigates how the diversification of 
nonprofit revenues influences revenue risks. Traditionally, the coefficient of variation 
(CV) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) have been used to measure revenue 
volatility risk and diversification, respectively. Because such measures may not be 
appropriate for all nonprofit organizations, this paper considers alternative measures: the 
value-at-risk (VaR, a measure of downside risk) and the portfolio variance index as a 
measure of portfolio diversification.  
The second essay— The Influences of Budgetary Size on State and Federal 
Government Grant Contributions between 2000 and 2011—discusses the impact of 
strenuous state fiscal condition on nonprofit organizations in the states. Government 
grants have been an important financial source for nonprofit organizations that can 
provide public services. However, there are few studies that have discussed the impact of 
the state governments’ expenditures on their grant contributions on nonprofits. I thus 
estimate whether nonprofits receive more from state and local governments if state 
governments spend more on general public services.  
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The third essay— Coping with Economic Crisis: The Buffering Capacity of U.S. 
States for the Nonprofit Sector—explores the nonprofit sector’s response to economic 
shocks and whether state characteristics intensified or mitigated the influence of the 
economic crisis. Economic crises have repeatedly occurred in the history of economies. 
Dealing successfully with unexpected external shocks is crucial to the survival of the 
nonprofit sector. Since few studies have examined the effects of an economic crisis on 
the nonprofit sector compared to studies on the for-profit and governmental sectors, this 
study can empirically contribute the market risk management and explain the unique 
characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of responding to an economic crisis. 
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Chapter One. Introduction to Nonprofit Finance and Revenues 
In the United States, a “charitable nonprofit organization” refers to an entity that 
is eligible for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 
2016, more than a million charitable nonprofits were in operation among the total of 1.5 
million tax-exempt organizations, including 105,030 private foundations and 368,337 
chambers of commerce, fraternal organizations, and civic leagues. To receive tax-exempt 
benefits, this type of charitable organization must be organized and operated to 
exclusively pursue its charitable mission rather than pursuing the interests of any one 
private shareholder or individual. These organizations’ activities vary among 
communities and include caring for veterans, rebuilding cities, educating children, 
supporting the workforce, nursing the sick, supporting the elderly, elevating the arts, 
mentoring the youth, and protecting natural resources, among other missions.  
This type of charitable nonprofit has several restrictions. If the organization 
transfers excessive benefits to someone who has substantial influence over the 
organization, then the person or the organization may have to pay an excise tax and risk 
the loss of tax-exempt status. In addition, organizations may not be involved in political 
and lobbying activities in which they attempt to influence legislation or specific political 
candidates’ campaigns.  
The central justification for tax-exempt status and for the limiting of nonprofits’ 
political activities is that these organizations provide public services to confer benefits to 
the community or to relieve burdens that the government would otherwise need to 
provide. In addition, tax exemption can be thought of as a kind of subsidy in which the 
government confers a benefit to nonprofits so that they may continue to produce positive 
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social value. The underlying assumption in this scenario is that, ideally, the social value 
of the public services the exempt organization provides will be equal to or greater than 
the amount of revenue loss caused by the tax exemption of these charitable organizations 
(Diamond, 2002). It may actually be more efficient to provide tax exemption to 
nonprofits than to provide services supported by public expenditure, which requires 
additional administration costs (Diamond, 2002). Since government support for 
nonprofits through tax exemptions is similar to an indirect subsidy, the financial 
sustainability of nonprofit organizations is an important consideration so that such 
organizations can continue to provide services on behalf of the government or to 
complement the government’s provision of services.  
Nonprofit Finance and Revenue Sources 
The nonprofit sector is a significant part of the U.S. economy. According to the 
Urban Institute (2017), in 2013, nonprofits employed more than 14.4 million workers 
(10.6% of the workforce) and contributed $634 billion in wages and salaries, which 
represented 8.9% of all wages and salaries paid in the United States that year. Nonprofits 
also earn their revenues from a variety of sources. In 2013, for example, public charities 
reported over $1.74 trillion in total revenues and $1.63 trillion in total expenses. Of the 
revenue, 21% was from contributions, gifts, and government grants; 72% was from 
program service revenues, including government fees and contracts; and 7% was from 
other sources, including dues, rental income, special event income, and gains or losses 
from goods sold.  
Nonprofit financial strategy and revenue management are important 
considerations, since nonprofits have different financial perspectives compared to for-
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profit organizations. First, the main difference between for-profit and nonprofit firms is 
that the ownership of nonprofits belongs to donors, as opposed to the autonomous 
ownership of for-profit firms (Bowman, 2002). Because of this ownership situation, for-
profit firms must maximize their profits, to be distributed to their anonymous individual 
investors. Nonprofit firms, in contrast, do not face pressure to create profits but instead 
have restrictions on asset utilization. For instance, the assets must be used to pursue the 
social benefits that the firm’s donors have supported. In other words, the assets cannot be 
invested to maximize on their return, which restricts the nonprofit revenue finance 
strategy. It is therefore important to apply advanced corporate finance strategies with 
caution, since the nonprofit sector has come to compete more and more with the private 
sector, which has used advanced finance and risk management strategies for many years.  
Second, the source of external revenue support (such as from the government) can 
affect the stability of nonprofit operations. Although government grants represent the 
second largest revenue sources for nonprofits, that revenue can depend on the financial 
stability of different levels of government. For instance, governments at all levels of the 
U.S. government paid $130 billion to U.S. nonprofits for services in 2014, but these 
government bodies did not pay the full costs of the services performed; more than half of 
nonprofits actually reported that the government had reimbursed them for less than 10 
percent of their organizational costs (National Council of Nonprofits, 2017). The 
government was also late in providing much of this reimbursement. Of nonprofits that 
provided programs and services to different government bodies in 2014, around one-
quarter found that the federal government had paid more than 30 days late. The problem 
was even more serious at the state and local levels, where late government payments 
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affected approximately 30–35 percent of nonprofit contractors (National Council of 
Nonprofits, 2017). Even though government support is generally known to be a stable 
and secure source of revenue for nonprofits, such underpayment or late payment can 
place nonprofits in financially difficult conditions (Beam and Conlan, 2002). For these 
reasons, studying changes in government grants awarded to nonprofits can provide useful 
information; in addition, since government grants are becoming a more significant part of 
nonprofits’ revenues in terms of maintaining financial security and mission-oriented 
objectives, an exploration of the understudied topic of government grants awarded to 
nonprofits is in order.  
Finally, the ability to successfully manage unexpected external shocks is crucial 
to the survival of the nonprofit sector. Economic crises have occurred repeatedly 
throughout the history of economics. Because few studies have examined the effects of 
an economic crisis on the nonprofit sector (compared to the number of studies that have 
been conducted on the public and private sectors), an examination of market risk 
management will help to explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in 
terms of its response to an economic crisis.  
Dissertation Chapters 
The first essay, “Nonprofit Revenue Strategy and Downside Risk: Applying 
Portfolio Theory and Extreme Value Theory,” investigates how the diversification of 
nonprofit revenue portfolios influences extreme revenue risks. Traditionally, economists 
have used the coefficient of variation and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to measure 
revenue volatility risk and diversification, respectively. As a result, having well-balanced 
portfolios with balanced assets is crucial for organizations to be able to adjust to 
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continuous volatility. The portfolio should have an appropriate number of revenue 
sources with a smaller correlation of revenue sources that will reduce portfolio volatility. 
The second essay, “The Influences of Budgetary Size on State and Federal 
Government Grant Contributions between 2000 and 2011,” discusses the impact of 
strenuous state fiscal conditions on nonprofit organizations in various states. Government 
grants are a significant financial supporter of nonprofit organizations that enable them to 
provide sufficient public services. Because few studies have discussed the impact of state 
government grant contribution expenditures on nonprofits, this essay will explore the 
determinants of state and local government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations in 
order to provide generalizable empirical research on sub-award grant mechanisms.  
 The third essay, “Coping with Economic Crisis: The Buffering Capacity of U.S. 
States for the Nonprofit Sector,” explores the nonprofit sector’s response to economic 
shocks and whether state characteristics intensified or mitigated the impact of the recent 
economic crisis. Economic crises have recurred throughout history, so the ability to 
successfully handle unexpected external shocks is crucial to the survival of the nonprofit 
sector. Few studies have examined the effects of economic crises on the nonprofit sector 
compared to the number of previous studies on the public and private sectors. This study 
can empirically contribute to the literature on market risk management and can explain 
the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of its response to an economic 
crisis. 
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Chapter Two. Nonprofit Revenue Strategy and Downside Risk: Applying Portfolio 
Theory and Extreme Value Theory 
Many nonprofits can be forced to shut down in very short time periods if they lose 
large donations or experience sudden changes in major revenue. Extreme value theory 
(EVT) models and measures the likelihood of such rare, extreme events of large 
magnitude. The theory is widely used to solve risk management problems in many fields, 
especially finance and stock investment (Alves & Neves, 2016; Choudhry & Wong, 
2013). Such extreme value studies can be critical because managers can prepare for one-
time extreme shocks that can significantly affect organizations, even jeopardizing their 
survival. For instance, the bottom 90% of charitable nonprofits that filed Form 990 
earned roughly $21 million on average in 2012, whereas the top 10% earned $609 million 
in revenue (IRS, 2015). The majority of small nonprofits may not be able to survive 
extreme revenue loss unless they understand their potential risks and have proper risk 
management directions in place, such as through a portfolio revenue strategy. Classifying 
revenue risks and investigating whether nonprofit organizations can mitigate the 
downside risk through different revenue strategies are both worthwhile endeavors.  
This study expands upon previous research by exploring how the nonprofit 
revenue strategy influences revenue risk. Revenue risk implies both downside risk and 
deviation risk. Most studies on revenue risk focus on mean deviation risk, which is 
measured by the standard deviation. The major problem with the use of standard 
deviation is that it focuses on estimating the risk of deviation from the average. Nonprofit 
managers may find it easier to address small increases or decreases from the average 
annual revenue, compared to significant declines in revenue. However, managers are 
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often concerned with large, unexpected losses (i.e., downside risk) since these extreme 
revenue losses can happen more frequently than what one expects and cause serious 
damage to the revenue of nonprofits. The chapter considers an alternative measure of 
risk: value-at-risk as a measure of downside risk. This approach is helpful in estimating 
the unexpected losses that nonprofits ultimately wish to minimize. 
For revenue strategy, I also consider alternative measures—portfolio variance for 
the portfolio revenue strategy measure—to compensate for the limitations of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) method, which focuses solely on the number of 
revenue sources and the equal distribution of those sources. I conclude in this chapter that 
portfolio revenue strategy, rather than revenue diversification, can decrease both 
downside risk and deviation risk. Other factors, such as financial flexibility and the 
growth potential of nonprofits, have different influences on downside risk and deviation 
risk.  
This study, therefore, investigates how the nonprofit revenue strategy influences 
financial risks. Traditionally, the coefficient of variation (CV) and Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) have been used to measure revenue volatility risk and diversification, 
respectively. Because such measures may not be appropriate for all nonprofit 
organizations, this chapter considers alternative measures: value-at-risk (a measure of 
downside risk) and the portfolio variance index as a measure of portfolio revenue 
strategy. The models employ a fixed-effects regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) 
standard errors and test multiple observations of service fields based on the National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) over a period of five years, from 2008 to 2012. 
The results indicate that portfolio revenue strategy can reduce the downside risk and 
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stabilize revenue inflow. Financial flexibility and growth potential all have different 
impacts on downside and deviation risk. This study adds to the current literature by 
contributing a different perspective of revenue risk and diversification to nonprofit 
researchers and managers.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 offers a brief introduction to EVT, 
summarizes the concept of the coefficient of variation (CV) in juxtaposition to the 
concept of value-at-risk, and provides the conceptual framework of Markowitz’s 
portfolio variance model. Section 2 introduces the hypotheses along with previous 
studies. Section 3 discusses the data and econometrics models that are applied in this 
study. Finally, sections 4, 5, and 6 present the statistical results and their implications for 
the nonprofit finance and risk management fields.  
Theoretical Background 
Extreme value theory (EVT) 
EVT examines periods of extreme events that represent the discontinuity of 
normal periods. During some periods, for example, much larger changes will occur than 
those predicted by the normal distribution, where the market exhibits relatively modest 
changes in prices and returns. This theory has been developed and applied in various 
fields, including insurance, financial markets, natural disasters, weather, and pollution 
studies, where the analysis of extreme outliers is particularly important (Alves & Neves, 
2016; Choudhry & Wong, 2013; Porter, 2007; Reiss, 2007). For example, the theory has 
been used to model extremely high temperatures or to evaluate the impact of earthquakes 
in different regions (Brown & Katz, 1995; Suzuki & Ozaka, 1994). 
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In the financial world, EVT has become more critical following the financial 
collapse of 2007–2008 as well as the 1987 stock market crash, often called Black 
Monday (Alves & Neves, 2016). Both financial crises significant impacted enough the 
market that they are difficult to categorize as normal market behavior. Specifically, the 
stock market return dropped around 23% in a single day on October 19, 1987, and by 
9.5% on October 15, 2008.   
Empirically speaking, EVT is associated with “fat-tailed” behavior, which implies 
the extreme risks inherent in finance. In other words, these extreme events might happen 
only rarely, but their impact can be larger than under normal, stable conditions, where 
clustering around the center of the normal probability distribution is more common 
(Kemp, 2011). For the most part, conservative investors prefer to avoid (or to prepare for) 
such unexpected outlier events, especially negative values in the left tail. 
Revenue risk: Deviation risk and downside risk 
Limitations of the coefficient of variation (CV). While CV is a useful tool for 
measuring financial volatility, it does have limitations. First, the measure presents 
deviation risk, which includes both upside and downside risk, and not specifically the latter. 
In financial risk management, the term “risk” refers to “a loss or an injury created by an 
activity” (Tarantino & Cernauskas, 2010, p. 2) and typically assumes the negative 
consequences of risk. CV essentially shows how the large majority of the actual revenue 
deviates above and below the mean (upside and downside risk). From a practical point of 
view, nonprofit managers are usually more concerned with excessive losses that occur with 
less frequency but have dire consequences for their organization.  
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Second, the use of CV as a volatility measure might be inaccurate in the case of 
skewed or leptokurtic (thick-tailed) non-normal distributions. The central limit theorem 
holds that the shape of the tail in a normal distribution is symmetric on both sides of the 
mean, which implies that the data are equally distributed around the middle. 
Unfortunately, the distribution of many nonprofits’ revenue is leptokurtic, with tails 
thicker than a normal probability distribution. This situation means that large fluctuations 
occur more frequently and with higher and lower values compared to normal 
distributions. Asymmetry also implies that CV can understate or overstate the downside 
risk since CV averages deviation risk in both directions. CV thus may be a misleading 
measure of revenue risk for nonprofits that wish to minimize their downside risk.  
Value-at-risk: Downside risk estimation. To measure the downside risk and 
overcome the limitation of the normal distribution, this chapter applies the concept of 
value-at-risk. The value-at-risk framework is widely used to measure and quantify losses 
that occur in the lower tail of a probability distribution, i.e., downside risk (Butler & 
Schachter, 1996). More specifically, value-at-risk answers the question of how much one 
expects to lose with a given probability—typically 1% or less. Value-at-risk provides the 
threshold value of the potential loss that is expected to be greater than the value-at-risk 
amount for a given probability. For example, if 1% of the value-at-risk on an asset equals 
a revenue decrease of 40%, then revenue declines of 40% or more are expected to happen 
in only 1% of all cases. 
In mathematical terms, value-at-risk is based on the percentile point function 
(𝑝𝑝𝑓(𝑝)) (or the quantile function), which is the inverse of the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) (𝐹(𝑋)). Specifically, CDF provides the probability of obtaining the 
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random variable X less than or equal to the given value x (or the proportion of the 
population with a value less than x). The ppf provides the threshold value of random 
variable x at a given probability, such as inverting x and y for the CDF (Haslwanter, 
2016; Shaw, 2007; Stover, 2017). Value-at-risk is defined as follows:  
 
   𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑋) = inf⁡{𝑥: 𝑃(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥) ≥ α}      (1) 
 
where X is the random variable describing the value of the loss of a portfolio, and 
α*100% (0 < α < 1) is a specific percentage that selects a sample of the worst cases for 
the portfolio to be analyzed (Acerbi & Tasche, 2002; Cade & Noon, 2003; Davino, 
Furno, & Vistocco 2014; Hosking & Wallis, 1987; Jorion, 2001; Teasdale, Kerlin, 
Young, & Soh, 2013). The quantile α is usually a small probability, such as .05, .01, 
or .001 (respectively, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%). This study, like many previous studies, will 
use the probability of 1%, which means that the events happen in the lowest 1% of the 
distribution (the first percentile).  
The qualitative benefits of EVT in the corporate sector are many, and yet, EVT 
theory and value-at-risk have not yet been actively applied to nonprofit finance. Despite 
the potential benefits of EVT to the nonprofit sector, the calculation of value-at-risk often 
requires ample data to generate the probability distribution of the downside tail. 
Corporate financial data are frequently collected in daily or weekly intervals, making it 
possible to find a value-at-risk specific to each firm. However, nonprofit finance data are 
reported on annual bases, which makes it difficult for researchers or risk managers to 
generate the probability distribution and calculate the value-at-risk. Alternatively, a 
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portfolio approach may be taken using pooled data from firms that share common 
attributes or characteristics (such as the healthcare sector). The value-at-risk of the 
subsector can be calculated based on the distribution of losses among organizations for 
given years. This approach has been often used in corporate finance literature to compare 
the individual firm to the industry, so that the individual firms can compare themselves to 
their peer organizations or competitors. I employ this subsector approach to the nonprofit 
subsectors.  
Table 1 illustrates the difference between the concepts of value-at-risk and CV in 
the context of the nonprofit subsectors. In the subsector of Arts, Culture, and Humanities, 
the value-at-risk is -0.81 for the average of years 2008–2012. This means that the average 
five-year revenue decline for the Arts subsector was equal to or less than -0.81 for 1% of 
the organizations in that subsector. Another way to say this is that revenue growth 
exceeded -0.81 for 99% of the organizations in the Arts subsector. The Environmental 
subsector provides an apt comparison. The value-at-risk for the Environmental subsector 
is larger than that for the Arts subsector, indicating that the Environmental sector has 
more downside risk. Specifically, 1% of the organizations in the Environmental subsector 
experienced revenue decline greater than or equal to 90%. What makes this comparison 
interesting is that by the CV measure, the Arts subsector has more dispersion of risk than 
the Environmental subsector. How is it that CV and value-at-risk produce seemingly 
contradictory results? The average and standard deviation are influenced by outliers, and 
the value-at-risk depends on the thickness of the tail. The Animal-related subsector is an 
example of relatively low financial risk, as indicated by both measures. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue; $, %Δ; Average 
2008-2012) 
 
  Value Volatility 
NTEE 
Code 
Description 
Total 
revenue ($) 
Total 
revenue 
(%Δ) 
Value-at-
risk 
(1%; %Δ) 
Coefficient 
of 
variation 
($) 
A 
Arts, Culture, & 
Humanities  
 25,300,000   468.74  -0.81 5.91 
B Education  85,300,000   7.36  -0.71 3.65 
C Environment  22,600,000   2.71  -0.90 3.50 
D Animal-Related   21,300,000   0.22  -0.67 1.75 
E 
Health Care 
 
197,000,000  
 12.42  -0.69 3.71 
F 
Mental Health & Crisis 
Intervention 
 24,700,000   0.36  -0.59 2.24 
G 
Disease, Disorders, & 
Medical Disciplines 
 48,300,000   0.47  -0.65 2.77 
H Medical Research  77,300,000   0.54  -0.80 3.00 
I Crime & Legal-Related   16,800,000   0.29  -0.72 2.67 
J Employment  27,000,000   0.12  -0.61 2.75 
K 
Food, Agriculture, & 
Nutrition 
 24,500,000   0.11  -0.65 3.95 
L Housing & Shelter  6,370,311  1,163.37 -0.86 3.76 
M 
Public Safety, Disaster 
Preparedness, & Relief 
 7,686,838   0.26  -0.83 2.32 
N Recreation & Sports  15,400,000   0.30  -0.59 6.73 
O Youth Development  10,100,000   0.27  -0.72 2.91 
P Human Services  26,000,000   5.52  -0.63 3.65 
Q 
International, Foreign 
Affairs, & National 
Security  
 96,100,000   4.64  -0.90 2.09 
R 
Civil Rights, Social 
Action, & Advocacy  
 30,200,000  
 
2,579.77  
-0.72 2.10 
S 
Community Improvement 
& Capacity Building  
 15,200,000   7.91  -0.82 3.96 
T 
Philanthropy, Voluntarism, 
& Grant-Making 
Foundations 
 34,200,000   30.96  -0.92 3.47 
U 
Science & Technology 
 
137,000,000  
 1.10  -0.81 3.64 
V Social Science  39,500,000 0.21 -0.54 1.79 
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Table 1 (continued) Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue; 
$, %Δ; Average 2008-2012) 
W Public & Societal Benefit  41,500,000  
 
3,758.98  
-0.85 3.08 
X Religion-Related   15,400,000   0.43  -0.86 2.65 
Y 
Mutual & Membership 
Benefit  
 71,700,000   3.46  -0.83 6.31 
Average  44,658,286  322.02 -0.75 3.37 
 
Nonprofit Revenue Strategy: Revenue equalization and portfolio diversification 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI was originally developed to 
quantify the competition of different industrial sectors (Herfindahl, 1951). Many scholars 
from the nonprofit sectors use HHI calculations to measure how concentrated or evenly 
distributed a nonprofit’s revenue sources are (Carroll & Stater 2009; Frumkin & Keating, 
2011), which I will refer to this revenue diversification measured by HHI as “revenue 
equalization.” Previous studies have used normalized HHI to measure diversification as 
follows:  
 
   𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 =
(1−∑ 𝑅𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 )
1−1 𝑛⁄
 ,   (2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the proportion of donations, earned revenue, and investment income, and 𝑛 is 
the number of revenue sources. This formulation ranges from 0 to 1, with a value closer to 
1 representing a more equal distribution among revenues, whereas 0 implies a perfect 
concentration. When a nonprofit has a higher number of revenue sources and equal 
distribution across those sources, its normalized HHI value will range from zero to one. 
Even though the HHI is a widely used measurement tool in the nonprofit finance 
sector, it may be misleading in terms of measuring revenue diversification. For instance, 
 
 
17 
some nonprofits are more highly dependent on revenue sources such as donative income 
than on commercial or investment income because of their organizational characteristics 
or charitable missions. But this revenue concentration automatically leads to a low HHI 
index, which implies that the nonprofit carries a low diversification level and high 
financial risk even what might not be true. In addition, the HHI method disregards the 
cross-correlation among revenues when measuring portfolio diversification, unlike the 
case with scholars who use modern portfolio theory.  
 
Portfolio strategy and risk model. The portfolio, in general, refers to a diversified 
collection of investments that can reduce the risk of investment return—in common 
parlance, not putting all your eggs in one basket (Tarantino & Cernauskas, 2010). 
Portfolio theory has contributed to the development and measurement of portfolio 
diversification and risk management (Fabozzi, 2012). Prior to the development of 
portfolio theory, diversification and risks were generally considered independent of each 
other, thus leading scholars to underestimate the covariance between assets (Fabozzi, 
2012). Markowitz (1952), however, formulated the portfolio variance model (popularly 
referred to as the theory of portfolio selection), which became the foundation of modern 
portfolio theory (Fabozzi, 2012). Well-diversified portfolios are efficient and can 
maintain high expected returns while lowering risk through an analysis of the covariance 
between asset returns (Fabozzi, 2012; Jegers, 1997).  
For multiple-asset portfolios, the variance of the portfolio return is the sum of the 
squared-weighted variances of the individual revenues plus twice the sum of the weighted 
pairwise covariance of the assets. For example, the equation measuring portfolio 
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diversification with the revenue of three assets—𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 , and 𝑅𝑘—is calculated as follows 
(Fabozzi, 2012, p. 10): 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜⁡𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡(𝑅𝑝) = 𝑤𝑖
2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖) + 𝑤𝑗
2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑗) + 𝑤𝑘
2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑘) +
2𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗) + 2𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑘) + 2𝑤𝑗𝑤𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑗 , 𝑅𝑘)    (3) 
 
where 𝑅𝑝 is the revenue portfolio; 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖), 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑗),⁡and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑘) are the variances of 
revenue i, j, and k; cov(Ri, Rj), cov(Ri, Rk), and cov(Rj, Rk) are the covariances between 
the revenues i, j, and k; 𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑗 ,⁡and 𝑅𝑘 ⁡are the returns of assets i, j, and k; and 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗 , and 
𝑤𝑘 are the weights of revenues i, j, and k. A higher portfolio variance value implies a less 
diversified (more volatile) portfolio.  
The key determinant of portfolio variance is the covariance of revenues. The 
Markowitz portfolio variance model emphasizes the importance of cross-correlation 
among revenue sources. For instance, the variance of a portfolio can increase if the 
revenue covariances are large and positive, which implies that the revenues move in the 
same direction: as asset A increases (decreases), asset B also increases (decreases). 
Ideally, negative correlations are best, but rare, since the negative value can reduce the 
portfolio variance. Perhaps nonprofits might be able to at least acquire nearly 
independent sources, where the correlation is close to zero. 
Table 2 helps to illustrate the difference between the HHI and portfolio variance 
in the context of nonprofit subsectors. For instance, the Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and 
Grant-Making Foundations subsector has relatively high values on both HHI, 0.64, and 
portfolio standard deviation, 0.69. These values tell us that this sector, on average, earns 
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from diverse revenue sources yet has high risk in regard to portfolios. In contrast, the 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities subsector has relative low values on both HHI, 0.12, and 
portfolio standard deviation, 0.16, meaning that this sector earns income from few 
sources but still has stable portfolios. This comparison tells us that diversifying revenue 
by adding more sources may not be equivalent to portfolio stability.  
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Revenue Diversification by Sector (Average 2008–2011) 
Nonprofit Subfields Diversification 
NTEE 
Code 
Description 
HHI (1 
diversified; 0 
concentrated) 
Standard 
deviation of 
portfolio* 
A Arts, Culture, & Humanities  0.12 0.16 
B Education 0.24 0.55 
C Environment 0.31 0.45 
D Animal-Related  0.16 0.12 
E Health Care 0.83 0.27 
F Mental Health & Crisis Intervention 0.29 0.12 
G Disease, Disorders, & Medical Disciplines 0.20 0.11 
H Medical Research 0.28 0.42 
I Crime & Legal-Related  0.23 0.51 
J Employment 0.40 0.20 
K Food, Agriculture, & Nutrition 0.33 0.12 
L Housing & Shelter 0.18 0.21 
M 
Public Safety, Disaster Preparedness, & 
Relief 
0.15 0.38 
N Recreation & Sports 0.43 0.19 
O Youth Development 0.11 2.06 
P Human Services 0.29 6.80 
Q 
International, Foreign Affairs, & National 
Security  
0.64 0.24 
R Civil Rights, Social Action, & Advocacy  0.53 0.22 
S 
Community Improvement & Capacity 
Building  
0.24 0.28 
T 
Philanthropy, Voluntarism, & Grant-Making 
Foundations 
0.62 0.69 
U Science & Technology 0.17 0.11 
V Social Science  0.39 0.16 
W Public & Societal Benefit 0.22 1.68 
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Table 2 (continued) Summary Statistics of Revenue Diversification by Sector (Average 
2008–2011) 
X Religion-Related  0.21 0.90 
Y Mutual & Membership Benefit  0.77 4.15 
Average 0.33 0.84 
* Standard deviation of portfolio is the square root of portfolio variance. 
  
Hypotheses and Variable Specification 
 The discussions in the previous section were about revenue volatility 
measurement (the limitations of CV and the potential benefits of value-at-risk) as well as 
diversification measurement (the limitations of HHI and the potential benefits of portfolio 
variance). I now will discuss several possible impacts of financial diversification on 
revenue risk, in the nonprofit finance sector. I examine the following hypotheses that 
build on previous studies (Table 3): 
H1: Greater revenue diversification will decrease revenue risk.  
H1(a) Revenue equalization as measured by HHI will decrease downside risk. 
H1(b) Portfolio diversification will decrease both deviation and downside risk. 
H2: Greater financial flexibility will decrease both deviation and downside risk.  
H3: Greater growth potential will decrease both deviation and downside risk.  
For a dependent variable, downside risk is calculated by value-at-risk at the 1% 
level (α = .01) of the percentage change of total revenue (part VIII, line 12, on IRS form 
990, p. 8, 2008). The interpretation is the expected threshold percentage change of total 
revenue that occurs in the lowest 1% of the organizations in the subsector. In addition, 
the deviation risk is measured by CV, which is the standard deviation divided by the 
average percentage change of total revenue (Carrol & Stater, 2009; Chang & Tuckman, 
1994; Chikoto & Neely, 2014; Mayer, Wang, Egginton, & Flint, 2014). A higher CV 
 
 
21 
value represents a larger standard deviation relative to the expected mean, which implies 
a greater level of revenue deviation risk. Note that I used the percentage change in total 
revenue to calculate both CV and value-at-risk (Yan, Denison, & Butler, 2009; Chikoto 
& Neely, 2014). This can normalize the impact of different sized revenues and include 
the zero value, unlike the logarithmic form.  
 The empirical models include different explanatory variables depending on the 
hypothesis. For nonprofit revenues, several scholars have confirmed that greater revenue 
equalization can reduce revenue deviation risk (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Chikoto & Neely, 
2014; Froelich, 1999; Frumkin & Keating, 2011; Mayer et al., 2014; Yan et al., 2009). It 
is well known in portfolio theory that revenue diversification can lower volatility. This is 
because greater diversification decreases the chances that all revenue sources will be 
exhausted at the same time. For example, if a nonprofit depends on only one source of 
revenue, then it may have high revenue risk since no back-up source exists. To measure 
revenue diversification, I will use the above mentioned HHI and portfolio variance. 
Therefore, under the broad first hypothesis that greater revenue diversification will 
decrease revenue risk, this chapter tests two specific hypotheses according to two 
different measurements: (a) revenue equalization will decrease downside risk and (b) 
portfolio diversification will decrease both deviation and downside risk. By testing these 
hypotheses, the results can show whether portfolio variance and value-at-risk are 
applicable to the nonprofit finance literature.  
 In addition to revenue diversification, several factors can influence revenue risk, 
such as financial flexibility and growth potential. Financial flexibility can connote 
financial leverage or the use of debt. According to Carroll and Stater (2009) and Mayer et 
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al. (2014), greater financial leverage can intensify or mitigate the impact of revenue risk. 
For instance, greater financial leverage become less vulnerable to economic shocks by 
enhancing the liquidity of the funds. Consequently, organizations with greater financial 
leverage can better plan their budgets for the future (thus minimizing risks), which is 
critical for stable revenue streams. Previous studies have measured financial leverage 
with the debt ratio (the total liability divided by total assets). A smaller debt margin 
means more financial leverage (Chang & Tuckman, 1994). Mayer et al. (2014) found that 
a greater debt margin (i.e., less financial leverage) increases revenue risk, which confirms 
H2.  
Another view of debt margin exists even though most of the literature in the 
nonprofit finance sector views the debt margin as a sign of limited financial capacity. In 
the risk management literature, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2004) found that 
financially constrained firms tend to keep their debt level low so that they can increase 
future debt capacity. Keeping a low debt margin allows the firm to borrow more in the 
future when a profitable investment opportunity arises. Therefore, a higher debt margin 
can be the sign of healthy level of investment since the nonprofits have invested 
profitable assets that they do not need to save the debt capacity for future opportunities.  
As well as debt margin, I use the share of permanent endowment relative to total 
endowment as a measure of financial flexibility. A high share of permanent endowment 
can show both an increase and a decrease in the impact of financial risk. As assumed in 
H2, a higher value of permanent endowment ratio can imply lower financial flexibility, 
which can increase the impact of revenue risk on nonprofits. If the nonprofits receive 
permanent endowments, they must preserve the principal in perpetuity. Such fixed assets 
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may not allow nonprofits room to deal with financial difficulties. Furthermore, the 
investment income from the endowments can naturally follow the fluctuation of the 
market value change of endowment. A higher share of restricted funds therefore can 
increase the revenue risk.  
On the contrary, a higher ratio of permanent to total endowment can decrease the 
impact of revenue risk. According to Tobin (1974), a higher value of permanent 
endowment ratio can mean financial stability in the long term over the generations. In 
theory, nonprofits with a high permanent endowment are able to diversify their assets and 
stabilize their endowment revenue, which would lead to a reduction in revenue risk.  
 Growth potential signals that a nonprofit’s financial health makes it a viable 
business. I measure growth potential by the fund balance (end-of-year assets minus 
beginning-of-year assets), retained earnings (total revenue minus total expenses), and net 
assets (total assets minus total liabilities and intangible assets) (Calabrese, 2012; Mayer et 
al., 2014). Higher fund balances, retained earnings, and net assets represent higher 
growth potential. Specifically, the fund balance refers to the accumulation of assets, such 
as savings or idle cash. Retained earnings refers to the accumulated surplus balances of 
the organization’s programs. Tangible assets such as rainy-day funds, buildings or 
automobiles, excluding intangible assets or liabilities comprise net assets. These assets 
can involve maintenance expenses but also earn revenue from fixed assets. The 
appropriate level of surplus revenues can provide nonprofits with the opportunity to 
respond to unexpected events and seize opportunities when they come, which translates 
into less risk and more stable and sustainable growth. Mayer et al. (2014) and Carroll and 
Stater (2009) confirmed that greater growth potential decreases revenue risk. As a 
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counter hypothesis, the risk management literature, generally, has found that higher 
profitability or growth potential is greatly associated with high risk (Probst and Raisch, 
2005; Reid and Turbide, 2011).  
Table 3 Selected Literature on Nonprofit Revenue Risk 
 
Study 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Measure 
Revenue 
Risk 
Measure 
Unit of 
Observation 
Result 
H1 
Mayer et al. 
(2014) 
HHI CV 
Nonprofits 
grossing more 
than $25,000 
Confirmed 
Carroll & 
Stater (2009) 
HHI CV Nonprofits ** Confirmed 
Yan et al. 
(2009)  
HHI 
Leverage 
(long-term 
debt / total 
assets) 
Arts, culture, and 
humanities 
nonprofits  
Confirmed 
Chikoto & 
Neely (2014) 
HHI 
Financial 
capacity 
growth* 
Nonprofits **  Opposite result  
H2 
Mayer et al. 
(2014) 
Debt margin 
Total margin 
CV 
Nonprofits 
grossing more 
than $25,000 
Confirmed with 
debt margin 
Carroll & 
Stater (2009) 
Debt margin 
Total margin 
CV Organizations** Insignificant 
H3 
Mayer et al. 
(2014) 
Net assets CV 
Nonprofits 
grossing more 
than $25,000 
Confirmed with 
net assets 
Carroll & 
Stater (2009) 
Fund 
balance 
Retained 
earnings 
CV Nonprofits ** 
Confirmed with 
fund balance and 
retained earnings 
* Chikoto and Neely (2014) measured financial capacity growth using the percentage 
growth in total revenue, total fund balance, and unrestricted fund balance. ** These 
papers controlled for service type by including the National Taxonomy of Exempt 
Entities (NTEE) as a control variable. 
 
Several organizational factors were also included as control variables in my study 
since funding capacity or stability may differ by organizational factors and size. 
Specifically, the following variables were included for organizational factors: years of 
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operation, the log of lagged employee salaries and benefits, the ratio of administration 
and fundraising expenses, the size of the governing board, the number of volunteers, and 
the share of unrelated business income (UBI). These variables represent the longevity of 
the nonprofit, its reputation, the involvement of communities, and the expanse of the 
organization. A greater value of these factors could decrease risk indirectly by changing 
the larger environment of the nonprofit.  
Particularly high functional expenses and overhead costs (i.e., administration and 
fundraising costs related to total expenses) can be considered indicators of organizational 
inefficiency. Mayer et al. (2014) and Chikoto and Neely (2014) found that greater 
fundraising or administration expenses decreases deviation risk. This situation may result 
when an organization’s management utilizes its limited resources to the best of their 
capabilities, which potentially increases revenue stability (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). 
Carroll and Stater (2009), however, did not find statistically significant results on the 
relationship between organizational efficiency and deviation risk. On the other hand, 
revenue can grow as the organizational efficiency increases until a certain point but can 
then decrease due to excessive spending on administration and fundraising activities 
(Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). Table 4 summarizes the detailed data sources.  
Table 4 Data Sources 
Variables 990 Form 
Revenue Volatility Total revenue (Part VIII, Line 12) 
Revenue Diversification 
Donative income (Part VIII, Line 1h) 
Earned income (Part VIII, Line 2g) 
Investment income (Part VIII, Line 3) 
Administration Efficiency 
Compensation (Part IX, Line 5) 
Total Expenses (Part I, Line 18) 
Fundraising Efficiency 
Fundraising Expenses (Part I, Line 16b) 
Total Expenses (Part I, Line 18) 
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Table 4 (continued) Data Sources 
Debt Margin_t-1 
Total liability (Part I, Line 21)  
Total assets (Part I, Line 20) 
Permanent endowment Endowment ratio (Part V, Line 2b) 
Fund balance 
End of year assets (Part X, Line 16, Column 1) 
Beginning of year assets (Part X, Line 16, Column 2) 
Retained earnings_t-1 
Total revenue (Part I, Line 12) 
Total expenses (Part I, Line 18) 
Net assets* Schedule D, Part VI, Total 
Year of operation Year of formation (Line L) 
Employee salaries and 
benefits_t-1 
Salaries, other compensation, employee benefits (Part 
I, Line 15) 
Number of voting members of 
the governing body 
Part I, Line 3 
Number of volunteers Part I, Line 6 
Share of Unrelated Business 
Income 
Part VIII, Line 12 
Total functional expenses Part IX, Line 25 
*The net asset value is calculated as total assets minus intangible assets and liabilities. Note 
that t-1 stands for the one-year lag value of the variable.  
 
Model Specification and Data 
 This study includes a primary model that investigates the impact of diversification 
on revenue volatility within a given subsector (service field) classified by National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) code. In this model, nonprofit revenue volatility is 
estimated as follows:  
  
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,   (4) 
 
where RR, RD, FF, GP, and C for i category of ΝΤΕΕ in year t represent the following 
categories of variables, respectively: revenue risk, revenue diversification, financial 
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flexibility, growth potential, and control variables. This econometric model was adapted 
from Carroll and Stater’s study (2009); the major difference is that I have applied an 
alternative measure of revenue volatility and diversification—value-at-risk and portfolio 
variance—in addition to the CV and HHI measures. Other differences are that Carroll and 
Stater’s unit of observation comprises individual organizations from 1991–2003, and they 
control for subfields; in contrast, my unit of observation comprises 25 NTEE subfield 
types from 2008–2012.  
Table 5 National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Codes 
NTEE Description NTEE Description 
A Arts, Culture, & Humanities  N Recreation & Sports 
B Education O Youth Development 
C Environment P Human Services 
D 
Animal-Related  
Q 
International, Foreign Affairs, & 
National Security  
E 
Health Care 
R 
Civil Rights, Social Action, & 
Advocacy  
F 
Mental Health & Crisis 
Intervention 
S 
Community Improvement & 
Capacity Building  
G 
Disease, Disorders, & 
Medical Disciplines 
T 
Philanthropy, Voluntarism, & 
Grant-Making Foundations 
H Medical Research U Science & Technology 
I Crime & Legal-Related  V Social Science  
J Employment W Public & Societal Benefit 
K 
Food, Agriculture, & 
Nutrition 
X 
Religion-Related  
L Housing & Shelter Y Mutual & Membership Benefit  
M 
Public Safety, Disaster 
Preparedness, & Relief 
Z 
Unknown 
* For the purpose of this research, 25 types of nonprofit organizations, coded from A to 
Y, were used, with the exception of the category “unknown,” which is Z.  
Note. From the National Center for Charitable Statistics. (2005). National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities. Retrieved from http://nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm. 
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Before the data were aggregated by subsectors, my panel data included 85,286 
total observations over five years. In terms of using Form 990 data, I followed the data-
clearing filters suggested by Bowman et al. (2012), although my data still included 
different types of small organizations in the sample. The original data had 100,344 total 
observations, I excluded nonprofits if they (1) reported group returns (575; 0.57%), (2) 
used non-accrual accounting (10,872; 10.83%), and (3) used non-positive assets or 
revenue (respectively 62 and 3,549; 0.06% and 3.54%) (Bowman, Tuckman, & Young, 
2012). Among the remaining 85,286 observations, each subfield included 750 
observations on average (table 6). Subfields related to social science, civil rights, social 
action, and advocacy was the smallest group with fewer than 100 observations for each 
year. 
Table 6 Number of Nonprofits by Year and Subfields 
NTEE 
Code 
Description 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
A 
Arts, Culture, & 
Humanities  
 767   829   721   731   767   3,815  
B Education  2,712   2,852   2,733   2,833   2,967   14,097  
C Environment  228   231   208   219   225   1,111  
D Animal-Related   129   146   120   124   130   649  
E Health Care  3,467   4,133   3,904   4,026   4,088   19,618  
F 
Mental Health & 
Crisis Intervention 
 280   377   277   286   294   1,514  
G 
Disease, Disorders, 
& Medical 
Disciplines 
 136   156   159   158   159   768  
H Medical Research  136   144   144   136   145   705  
I 
Crime & Legal-
Related  
 96   112   97   99   99   503  
J Employment  411   447   424   443   467   2,192  
K 
Food, Agriculture, 
& Nutrition 
 128   156   147   151   172   754  
L Housing & Shelter  836   932   728   753   792   4,041  
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Table 6 (continued) Number of Nonprofits by Year and Subfields 
M 
Public Safety, 
Disaster 
Preparedness, & 
Relief 
 61   76   69   70   74   350  
N 
Recreation & 
Sports 
 986   1,006   995   1,013   1,060   5,060  
O 
Youth 
Development 
 149   166   118   125   135   693  
P Human Services  2,004   2,130   1,710   1,782   1,805   9,431  
Q 
International, 
Foreign Affairs, & 
National Security  
 181   202   182   200   200   965  
R 
Civil Rights, Social 
Action, & 
Advocacy  
 29   23   24   28   34   138  
S 
Community 
Improvement & 
Capacity Building  
 832   893   858   882   956   4,421  
T 
Philanthropy, 
Voluntarism, & 
Grant-Making 
Foundations 
 494   518   527   575   623   2,737  
U 
Science & 
Technology 
 116   130   132   134   136   648  
V Social Science   23   25   24   31   32   135  
W 
Public & Societal 
Benefit 
 242   267   239   259   262   1,269  
X Religion-Related   166   177   155   154   170   822  
Y 
Mutual & 
Membership 
Benefit  
 1,669   1,710   1,823   1,806   1,842   8,850  
  Total   16,278   17,838   16,518   17,018   17,634   85,286  
 
The number of observation is 125 aggregated observations, with 25 NTEE fields 
over a five-year period between 2008 and 2012, retrieved from Form 990 (IRS, 2015). 
For the analysis, I use data after 2008 since Form 990 changed significantly in 2008, 
creating inconsistent data. The specific NTEE codes are shown in table 5. The variables 
were calculated from individual nonprofits, which were then averaged by NTEE 
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subfields. For example, for the value-at-risk of total revenue in percentage change, the 
percentage change in total revenue was calculated at the organizational level and the 
value at 1 percentile (lowest) was chosen within NTEE subfields. For dependent and 
control variables, values were calculated at the organizational level and then averaged by 
subsectors and year. For certain control variables, a few observations were excluded 
before I created the average value by subsector in cases where certain variables had a 
logarithmic form or negative or zero denominators. After dropping these observations, 
more than 99% of the total observations remained. 
Table 7 Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue; $, %Δ; Average 
2008-2012) 
   Value Volatility 
NTEE 
Code 
Description 
Total 
revenue ($) 
Total 
revenue 
(%Δ) 
Value-at-
risk 
(1%; %Δ) 
Coefficient 
of 
variation 
($) 
A 
Arts, Culture, & 
Humanities  
 25,300,000   468.74  -0.81 5.91 
B Education  85,300,000   7.36  -0.71 3.65 
C Environment  22,600,000   2.71  -0.90 3.50 
D Animal-Related   21,300,000   0.22  -0.67 1.75 
E 
Health Care 
 
197,000,000  
 12.42  -0.69 3.71 
F 
Mental Health & Crisis 
Intervention 
 24,700,000   0.36  -0.59 2.24 
G 
Disease, Disorders, & 
Medical Disciplines 
 48,300,000   0.47  -0.65 2.77 
H Medical Research  77,300,000   0.54  -0.80 3.00 
I Crime & Legal-Related   16,800,000   0.29  -0.72 2.67 
J Employment  27,000,000   0.12  -0.61 2.75 
K 
Food, Agriculture, & 
Nutrition 
 24,500,000   0.11  -0.65 3.95 
L 
Housing & Shelter 
 6,370,311  
 
1,163.37  
-0.86 3.76 
M 
Public Safety, Disaster 
Preparedness, & Relief 
 7,686,838   0.26  -0.83 2.32 
N Recreation & Sports  15,400,000   0.30  -0.59 6.73 
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Table 7 (continued) Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue; 
$, %Δ; Average 2008-2012) 
O Youth Development  10,100,000   0.27  -0.72 2.91 
P Human Services  26,000,000   5.52  -0.63 3.65 
Q 
International, Foreign 
Affairs, & National 
Security  
 96,100,000   4.64  -0.90 2.09 
R 
Civil Rights, Social Action, 
& Advocacy  
 30,200,000  
 
2,579.77  
-0.72 2.10 
S 
Community Improvement 
& Capacity Building  
 15,200,000   7.91  -0.82 3.96 
T 
Philanthropy, Voluntarism, 
& Grant-Making 
Foundations 
 34,200,000   30.96  -0.92 3.47 
U 
Science & Technology 
 
137,000,000  
 1.10  -0.81 3.64 
V Social Science   39,500,000   0.21  -0.54 1.79 
W 
Public & Societal Benefit 
 41,500,000  
 
3,758.98  
-0.85 3.08 
X Religion-Related   15,400,000   0.43  -0.86 2.65 
Y 
Mutual & Membership 
Benefit  
 71,700,000   3.46  -0.83 6.31 
Average  44,658,286  322.02 -0.75 3.37 
 
 
Descriptive findings 
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for each variable in the analysis. 
Nonprofits, on average, had a 12.17 standard deviation of the percentage change in total 
revenue, meaning they had a high revenue deviation. Their revenues seem to be 
concentrated on one revenue source between  donations, earned income, and investment 
revenue (they had an HHI of 0.33). Their average portfolio across all subsectors was .84, 
or 84% of the standard deviation of the portfolio. Excluding the exceptionally high 
standard deviation in the portfolio in certain subfields, such as Youth Development, 
Human Services, and Mutual and Membership, the average standard deviation of the 
portfolio was approximately .37, or 37%. Note that a negative value-at-risk should be 
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interpreted with an absolute value. For example, a value-at-risk of -.75 for the percentage 
change of total revenue means that the nonprofits, on average, will have 75% or greater 
percentage change in 1% of the organizations.  
For financial flexibility, the average debt margin was roughly $.53 per asset, or 
almost half their assets. The ratio of permanent endowment was around 15%. On average, 
organizations had positive growth potential, such as a $53 increase in assets in the current 
year, relative to assets in the previous year (fund balance), $2.38 of revenue per total 
expenses (retained earnings), and $17 million of net assets.  
Organizations in the sample have operated for around 50 years on average and 
have a payroll of roughly $15 million. The average nonprofit spent around 6% and 3% on 
administration and fundraising, respectively. They have around 25 voting members on 
each organization’s governing body. On average, they have approximately 1% of UBI 
and have expenses of $40 million. The correlations among the explanatory and control 
variables were low. The variance inflation test (VIF) also indicated that the model was 
controlled for potential multicollinearity.  
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Downside risk ($1,000 of total revenue; 
value-at-risk at 1%) 129.81 85.43 14.20 419.35 
      Downside risk (% Δ of total revenue; value-
at-risk at 1%) -0.75 0.17 -0.98 -0.27 
      Deviation risk ($ of total revenue; CV) 3.37 1.73 1.40 13.91 
Deviation risk (%Δ of total revenue; CV) 12.17 16.02 -74.13 57.56 
      Portfolio diversification (standard deviation 
of portfolio)  0.84 3.57 0.09 33.35 
      Revenue equalization (HHI; 0→1; more 
diversified) 0.33 0.22 0.00 1.00 
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Table 8 (continued) Descriptive Statistics 
FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY  
      Debt margin (total liability / total assets; lag) 0.53 1.07 0.14 11.54 
      Permanent endowment (% / total endowment) 15.62 11.10 0.20 39.61 
GROWTH POTENTIAL 
      Fund balance (million $; end assets / 
beginning assets) 
53.12 52.21 4.27 214.13 
      Retained earnings (million $; total revenue / 
total expenses; lag) 
2.38 3.99 -7.95 24.33 
      Net assets (million $; assets–intangible 
assets–liabilities)  
17.24 19.86 0.56 86.81 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
      Years of operation (#) 47.14 11.06 24.09 68.61 
      Employee salaries and benefits (million $; 
lag) 
14.87 19.50 1.14 85.57 
      Number of voting members of the governing 
body (#) 
25.50 20.53 9.05 170.43 
      Number of volunteers (#) 4.54 0.76 2.73 6.69 
      Share of unrelated business income (UBI / 
total revenue) 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 
      Administration efficiency (administration 
expenses / total expenses)  
0.06 0.03 0.01 0.12 
      Fundraising efficiency (fundraising expenses / 
total expenses)  
0.03 0.02 0.00 0.09 
      Total functional expenses (million $) 38.50 42.73 2.81 207.26 
Observations (25 NTEE, 2008–2012) 125 
* All values are rounded to two decimal places. 
 
Estimation Results 
My models used fixed effects with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) standard errors, which 
correct for correlations between sectors and correlations within sectors. Prior to running 
the fixed effects regression model, several tests were conducted to estimate the method. 
To make a selection between the fixed and random effects models, I ran a Hausman test, 
which rejected the null hypothesis that the preferred model was random; thus, I selected 
the fixed effects model (Greene, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). The average absolute 
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correlation suggested that all four models exhibited cross-sectional dependence (i.e., high 
average absolute correlation values) even though the Pesaran test for cross-sectional 
independence failed to reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (De 
Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). The modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity in 
fixed effects models indicated that all four models had heteroscedasticity. After 
considering these tests, I employed the fixed effects model using D-K standard errors. 
Hoechle (2007) suggested robust standard estimates for panel models (or fixed effects 
within regression models with D-K standard errors). This method helps to control for 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependency. Additionally, some 
variables such as debt margin, retained earnings, and employee salaries and benefits used 
one-year lag values to control the potential endogeneity of variables.  
One potential problem is reverse causality between revenue diversification and 
volatility (Carroll & Stater, 2009). In other words, it is plausible that nonprofits with high 
revenue risk might diversify their revenue sources even though I have hypothesized that 
revenue diversification will reduce their revenue risk. To correct for this potential 
endogeneity, I also estimated a fixed effects model with instrumental variables as lagged 
dependent and explanatory variables. The fixed effects model with lagged explanatory 
variables was comparable with my model, however, which did not show any substantive 
differences in the statistical results. This situation shows that no apparent evidence was 
found that diversification is endogenously determined.  
 Combining the two different measures of diversification and volatility produced 
three models (Table 9). The first model used deviation risk measured by CV and portfolio 
diversification measured by the portfolio standard deviation, which is the square root of 
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the portfolio variance. This model showed statistically significant results in hypotheses 
1(b) and 3. For H1(b), the existence of a more diversified portfolio decreased the 
deviation, as expected and as portfolio theory generally assumes. Specifically, as 
portfolio standard deviation increases (less diversification), the standard deviation of 
percentage change of total revenue is increased by 0.52, or 52%.  
For H3, results show mixed directions for the impact of growth potential on 
deviation risk. The existence of a higher fund balance and retained earnings was found to 
increase the deviation risk, but higher net assets decreases the risk. Specifically, with a 
1% increase in the current year assets compared to the previous year assets, the standard 
deviation of percentage change of total revenue is increased by 0.21, or 21%. As the 
retained earnings from the previous year increase by $1 million, the standard deviation of 
percentage change of total revenue increases by 0.463, or 46.3%. On the other hand, as 
net assets increase by 1%, the standard deviation of percentage change of total revenue is 
decreased by 0.095, or 9.5%, as previous research confirmed (Mayer et al, 2014). These 
results imply that nonprofits with larger accumulations of assets and net profits might 
pursue riskier revenue sources with high return (high deviation risk); one with higher 
fixed assets might be more inclined to keep themselves in the stable assets.   
 Model 2 tests the impact of revenue equalization (using HHI) on downside risk 
(value-at-risk). This model showed statistically significant results for hypotheses 1(a), 2, 
and 3. For H1(a), organizations with equally distributed revenue among donations, earned 
revenue, and investment income were found to encounter lower downside risk. For 
example, the average value-at-risk was -.75 across subsectors (Table 8), meaning that 1% 
of nonprofits can lose 75% or more. With a one unit increase in HHI (more revenue 
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sources or equally distributed sources), the percentage change of revenue is increased by 
17.4%, which leads to a positive impact on the negative value-at-risk. Therefore, the 
average value-at-risk become approximately -.62 across subsector, meaning that 1% of 
nonprofits can lose 62% or more after perfect revenue equalization. This means that 
revenue equalization by adding more revenue sources or distributing equally among 
revenue sources reduces the downside risk. 
Higher liability relative to an organization’s assets (i.e., greater financial 
inflexibility) decreases downside risk, as opposed to my expectation in H2. An increase 
in total liability per assets has a positive impact on negative downside risk, which reduces 
downside risk. For instance, the average value-at-risk of -.75 moves toward zero due to 
the positive coefficient of .027 or 2.7%. This finding suggests that organizations with 
larger debt can be less likely to be in situations where the chance of extreme revenue loss 
will increase. Nonprofits with a higher debt ratio may already have stable financial 
conditions such that they do not need to save debt capacity for future investment. 
Potentially, these organizations are less influenced by extreme revenue loss. Furthermore, 
a higher ratio of permanent endowment relative to the total endowment decreases 
downside risk. Contrary to my assumption that an organization with more restricted funds 
could undergo a liquidity crisis, a high endowment ratio seems to reduce the impact of 
downside risk. Higher fund balances and net assets (i.e., greater growth potential) seem to 
increase downside risk, contrary to H3. It seems that organizations with higher asset 
increase are associated with higher downside risk. Additionally, nonprofits with more 
years of operation and that spend less on employee salaries seems to have less downside 
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risk. On the other hand, nonprofits that rely more on volunteers seems to have higher 
downside risk.  
 Compared to model 2, model 3 uses portfolio diversification as an explanatory 
variable. As I assumed in H1(b), portfolio diversification decreases downside risk. The 
negative coefficient of -.007 implies that a less diversified portfolio (higher variance) 
negatively influences the negative value-at-risk, meaning that more a diversified portfolio 
considering inter-correlations among different revenue sources decreases the impact of 
extreme revenue loss.  
Table 9 Fixed-effect Regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) Standard Errors 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Deviation Risk 
(% Δ; CV) 
Downside Risk 
(% Δ; value-at-
risk at 1%) 
Downside Risk 
(% Δ; value-at-
risk at 1%) 
Revenue equalization (HHI; 
0→1; diversified) 
 0.174*  
 (0.081)  
Portfolio diversification 
(standard deviation of portfolio)  
0.520***  -0.007*** 
(-0.124)  (0.0004) 
Debt margin (total liability / 
total assets; lag) 
-0.822 0.027*** 0.026*** 
(-0.498) (0.003) (0.004) 
Permanent endowment (%) 
0.215 0.006** 0.005* 
(-0.259) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fund balance (ln; end-beginning 
of year assets)  
21.000* -0.191*** -0.188*** 
(-9.723) (0.035) (0.042) 
Retained earnings (million $; 
revenue-expenses; lag) 
0.463* -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.174) (0.002) (0.001) 
Net assets (ln; book value)  
-9.544** -0.073* -0.076** 
(-3.185) (0.027) (0.024) 
Year of operation (#) 
-0.457 0.015* 0.017* 
(-0.663) (0.007) (0.007) 
Employee salaries and benefits 
(ln; lag) 
-13.796+ 0.214** 0.211** 
(-7.122) (0.057) (0.066) 
Number of voting members of 
the governing body (ln) 
-28.356+ 0.079 0.139 
(-15) (0.544) (0.594) 
Number of volunteers  
14.250*** -0.081** -0.078*** 
(-3.713) (0.022) (0.017) 
Share of unrelated business 
income (UBI) 
598.063** -0.583 0.596 
(-163.714) (2.805) (2.732) 
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Table 9 (continued) Fixed-effect Regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) Standard Errors 
Administration efficiency 
(administration cost ratio) 
68.107 -0.596 -0.263 
(-195.278) (2.405) (2.680) 
Fundraising efficiency 
(fundraising cost ratio) 
-150.315+ -2.105 -2.262 
(-84.968) (2.297) (2.621) 
Total functional expenses (ln) 
33.453* -0.020 -0.079 
(-12.66) (0.081) (0.081) 
Constant 
13.489*** -0.331 0.435 
(-2.699) (0.776) (0.786) 
R-squared F 9.639 7.398 12.966 
Observations 125 (25 NTEE, 2008–2012) 
 
 Table 10 shows results with both revenue equalization and portfolio 
diversification in the same models. A diversified portfolio (lower portfolio standard 
deviation) decreases both deviation risk and downside risk while revenue equalization 
measured by HHI become statistically insignificant. This direct comparison suggests that 
portfolio variance has a stronger influence on explaining revenue risks than revenue 
equalization. In other words, controlling for portfolio diversification seems to make HHI 
an insignificant measure for revenue diversification.  
Table 10 Fixed-effect regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) standard errors with both 
revenue equalization and portfolio diversification 
  (1) (2) 
 
Deviation 
Risk (% Δ; 
CV) 
Downside 
Risk (% Δ; 
value-at-risk 
at 1%) 
Revenue equalization (HHI; 0→1; diversified) 
-9.150 0.167 
(13.336) (0.085) 
Portfolio diversification (standard deviation of portfolio)  
0.516*** -0.007*** 
(0.124) (0.0004) 
Debt margin (total liability / total assets; lag) 
-0.870 0.027*** 
(0.508) (0.003) 
Permanent endowment (%) 
0.182 0.006* 
(0.268) (0.003) 
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Table 10 (continued) Fixed-effect regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) standard errors 
with both revenue equalization and portfolio diversification 
Fund balance (ln; end-beginning of year assets)   
21.158* -0.191*** 
(10.175) (0.035) 
Retained earnings (million $; revenue-expenses; lag) 
0.481** -0.003 
(0.148) (0.002) 
Net assets (ln; book value)  
-9.597** -0.075** 
(3.360) (0.023) 
Year of operation (#) 
-0.492 0.018** 
(0.657) (0.006) 
Employee salaries and benefits (ln; lag) 
-15.000 0.232*** 
(8.653) (0.060) 
Number of voting members of the governing body (ln) 
-26.440 0.105 
(14.983) (0.559) 
Number of volunteers  
14.576** -0.084*** 
(4.257) (0.020) 
Share of unrelated business income (UBI) 
633.091** -0.043 
(210.691) (2.603) 
Administration efficiency (administration cost ratio) 
69.309 -0.285 
(200.404) (2.548) 
Fundraising efficiency (fundraising cost ratio) 
-151.017 -2.249 
(88.072) (2.464) 
Total functional expenses (ln) 
30.834** -0.032 
(9.016) (0.084) 
Constant 
-9.150 0.167 
(13.336) (0.085) 
R-squared F 9.639 7.398 
Observations 125 (25 NTEE, 2008–2012) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. Some variables are 
applied in the logarithmic form (ln). The net asset value is calculated as total assets minus 
intangible assets and liabilities. 
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Discussion 
 This chapter addressed the following questions: Can nonprofits reduce downside 
revenue risk and revenue volatility by diversifying their revenue portfolios? How should 
they deal with different types of risks? My findings contribute in three different ways to 
answer these questions in the nonprofit finance and risk management fields. First, a well-
diversified portfolio, as measured by portfolio standard deviation, stabilizes revenue 
inflows and also makes an organization less vulnerable to major losses (downside risk). 
In addition, organizations that focus on simply increasing the number of revenue sources 
may not effectively decrease revenue risks when also considering portfolio 
diversification. Therefore, having well-balanced portfolios with balanced assets is crucial 
for adjusting to continuous volatility. The portfolio should have an appropriate number of 
revenue sources and a correlation of revenue sources that reduces portfolio volatility. The 
balance eventually prolongs the long-term sustainability of the nonprofits.  
 Second, portfolio diversification matters more important for larger organizations. 
As both risk measurements are relative terms (CV and value-at-risk calculated based on 
the percentage change of total revenue), organizations that have larger expected revenue 
returns will suffer larger losses during times of financial crisis. Like a house of cards, 
nonprofits’ portfolios require a more delicate balance as their size gets larger.  
Lastly, what should nonprofit managers consider most in terms of portfolio 
diversification? Based on portfolio variance, the covariance of revenue sources is the key 
factor when deciding on portfolio diversification. By nature of the calculation of portfolio 
variance, portfolio variance will inevitably increase by adding more revenue sources 
unless the revenue sources are negatively correlated. If no correlation or inverse 
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relationships exist among the revenues, then the covariances will have no impact or will 
decrease the portfolio variance. In this case, the more revenue sources you have will 
increase portfolio variance by a lower amount. In reality, however, negative correlations 
among assets are rare. On the contrary, if revenue sources are positively correlated, 
portfolio variance becomes larger. It would therefore be better if the organizations pursue 
fewer revenue sources than adding more.  
Conclusion 
 Using a panel of nonprofit financial information obtained from the IRS 990 form 
for the period between 2008 and 2012, I used a fixed effects regression model with D-K 
standard errors (which controls for the correlations within and between NTEE categories) 
to empirically examine whether revenue diversification influences revenue risks. I find 
that portfolio diversification can be helpful for nonprofits to reduce downside financial 
risk and has a stabilizing effect on revenue inflows. Other factors, such as financial 
liquidity and growth potential, also influence downside risk.  
 My findings have several implications for the nonprofit finance sector and for 
EVT in general. First, nonprofit organizations should have a proper portfolio with a 
greater number of revenue sources in place to reduce unexpected negative losses. Second, 
this study has applied alternative measures from those traditionally used in nonprofit 
finance literature: I used portfolio variance instead of HHI for the diversification measure 
and value-at-risk instead of CV for the risk measure. These alternative measures 
compensate for the weakness of the traditional measures and will help nonprofit 
managers and scholars to better consider the impact of portfolio diversification on 
downside risk. Finally, this study has applied the concept of value-at-risk from the 
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corporate finance sector for the nonprofit finance sector to greater understand risk. Future 
researchers should more specifically identify the correlations among nonprofit revenue 
sources so that nonprofit managers can develop well-fitted portfolios for their 
organizations that will eventually mitigate revenue risks and promote sustainable, long-
term growth. 
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Chapter Three. The Influences of Budgetary Size on State and Federal 
Government Grant Contributions between 2000 and 2011  
Government contributions are one major revenue source for nonprofits. In 2013, 
32.5% of NPOs’ revenue came from government funding (McKeever, 2015), which in 
general includes federal, state, or local governments. According to the Federal Assistance 
Award Data System (FAADS), 7% of total federal government grants, representing $36.3 
billion of the $537 billion awarded in 2012, are awarded directly to NPOs (Lecy & 
Thornton, 2016). However, the primary mechanism for government grant awards to 
NPOs is by means of a “pass-through” of sub-awards from the federal government to 
state and local governments. The federal government transfers 80.1% ($431 billion out of 
$537 billions) of its grants to state governments; the amount of grant transfers from state 
and local governments to NPOs remains unknown.  
In addition, the source of external revenue support (such as from the government) 
can affect the stability of nonprofit operations. Although government grants represent the 
second largest revenue source for nonprofits, that revenue can depend on the financial 
stability of different levels of government. For instance, governments at all levels of the 
U.S. government paid $130 billion to U.S. nonprofits for services in 2014, but these 
governmental bodies did not pay the full costs of the services performed; more than half 
of the nonprofits actually reported that the government had reimbursed them for less than 
10 percent of their organizational costs (National Council of Nonprofits, 2017). The 
government was also late in providing much of this reimbursement. Of nonprofits that 
provided programs and services to different government bodies in 2014, around one-
quarter found that the federal government had paid more than 30 days late. The problem 
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was even more serious at the state and local levels, where late government payments 
affected approximately 30–35 percent of nonprofit contractors (National Council of 
Nonprofits, 2017). Even though government support is generally known to be a stable 
and secure source of revenue for nonprofits, such underpayment or late payment can 
place nonprofits in financially difficult conditions. For these reasons, studying changes in 
government grants awarded to nonprofits can provide useful information; in addition, 
since government grants are becoming a more significant part of nonprofits’ revenues in 
terms of maintaining financial security and mission-oriented objectives, an exploration of 
the understudied topic of government grants awarded to nonprofits is in order.  
Most previous research on government contributions and government-NPO 
partnerships has focused on specific service fields, individual NPOs, or isolated cases, 
events, or states (Ashley & Slyke, 2012; Gazely, 2008; Hansamann, 1987; Luksetich, 
2008; Saidel, 1991; Sandfort, 1999; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). However, little 
comprehensive or generalizable empirical research on government-NPO partnerships 
exists. In addition, few studies have examined government contributions to NPOs at 
different governmental levels. As the extent of state government grants to NPOs remains 
unknown (Ashley & Slyke, 2012; Lecy & Thornton, 2016), the topic is worth studying; 
the same can be said of federal government grant funding.  
This study, therefore, estimates the effect of the size of government expenditures 
on the amounts of state and federal government grant awards to nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs) at the state level. It also analyzes the differences in the responses of the states and 
the federal government. A fixed effects model of states and years controls for five factors 
at the state level that were identified in previous research: service field, organization, 
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political activity, economics, and demographics. The empirical results demonstrate that 
smaller state government expenditures correspond to state government grant awards to 
NPOs, that state and federal grants target different demographic groups, and that NPOs 
with state contributions tend to diversify their revenue sources, whereas NPOs with 
federal contributions tend to simplify their revenue sources and encourage private 
funding. This research, then, is to contribute to a better understanding among nonprofit 
researchers and professionals of the allocation of state and federal government grant 
funding, and of its relationship to state government budgets. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The hypothesis is developed in sections (1) 
Fiscal Federalism and NPOs and (2) State Government and Government Contributions to 
NPOs. NPOs’ need for government grants is explained in Government Grants as a Tool 
in the Government-NPO Partnership. The section Legitimacy of Government 
Involvement through Grant Awards explains how government benefits by awarding 
grants to NPOs. Method and Model Specification explains the variables and data sources 
and introduces two models and the study methodology. Finally, the Results and Policy 
Implications and Conclusions sections include the interpretation of statistical results, a 
discussion of the implications of the study findings, and suggestions for future research.  
External Income Sources in Nonprofit Organizations 
NPOs’ external income typically comes from three sources: direct public support, 
indirect public support, and government contributions (grants), as categorized under part 
I of tax Form 990 (an annual reporting return that certain federal tax-exempt 
organizations must file with the IRS). Regardless of income, all 501(c)(3) private 
foundations and most federal tax-exempt organizations are required to file Form 990 
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(Powell & Steinberg, 2006). NPOs’ external income sources can be interrelated as inter-
organizational relationships.  
Government Grants as a Tool in the Government-NPO Relationship 
Obtaining and maintaining government grants can be expensive (Grønbjerg, 
1993), and organizations that receive such grants are required to undertake more complex 
and time-consuming financial reporting than those relying primarily on individual or 
private contributions (Anheier, 2005; Salamon & Anheier, 1997). For example, since 
2007, the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) (2014) has 
investigated and awarded grants to children’s advocacy center programs annually; these 
are generally run by nonprofit and for-profit organizations and institutes of higher 
education. The OJJDP offers total one-year program funding of $750,000, with second- 
and third-year funding allocated on the basis of performance. This funding assists NPOs 
capable of providing coordinated support to victims of child abuse. However, the grant 
application process demands significant time and effort. In a given year, applicants must 
submit approximately 30 pages of information by May 25, including a project abstract, a 
budget and budget narrative, performance measures, and other data, all of which must be 
supported by bibliographical references. The review process includes an internal peer 
review, an external peer review, a review by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, 
and a review by the Assistant Attorney General. The award is made no later than 
September 30 of the same year. Some NPOs require years of preparation before they can 
apply for this grant; indeed, Bowman (2011) noted that preparing a government grant 
proposal should be treated as a fundraising expense. 
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 NPOs need government grants for three reasons. The first of these is revenue 
diversification; NPOs with a mix of revenue streams are better equipped to manage 
financial risk and to reduce their vulnerability to financial hardship and uncertainty 
(Carroll & Stater, 2009; Grønbjerg, 1993; Webb, 2014; Young, 2007). Because 
government grants tend to be larger than private contributions, they can also be used as 
seed money to match funds from non-grant sources. A balance of low-risk, predictable 
revenue from government grants and other high-return, higher-risk investments can 
support an organization’s long-term financial sustainability (Seaman & Young, 2010). In 
an empirical test of the revenue sources of 156 foster care organizations, Kingma (1993) 
found that NPOs with a higher percentage of revenue from government sources 
experienced lower than average volatility levels. 
 Second, the reputation of NPOs in receipt of government grants engenders trust 
among private contributors (Andreoni & Payne, 2011). While private donors have little 
access to information about how NPOs spend their funds (Ostrom, 1996), NPOs must 
prove their experience and the legitimacy of their services or programs, and must have 
the necessary infrastructure to serve their clients in order to successfully apply for 
government grants. A government grant therefore conveys a powerful message to private 
contributors about an organization’s managerial and administrative capacity. Nikolova 
(2014) found that private donors in the U.S. are more likely to respond positively to 
information about government funding from national and international sources than to 
information about organizational efficiency or age. 
 Finally, government grants are more broadly accessible than private contributions, 
and they are less likely to lead to mission displacement. Government support is more 
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widely dispersed than private contributions, which generally favor large and popular 
NPOs with simple mission statements (DiMaggio, 1987; Grønbjerg, 1993). In an 
investigation of the relationship between government and NPOs, Salamon (1995) 
concluded that government funding produces relatively small shifts in the missions of 
organizations that pursue diverse revenue streams. In summary, government grants 
encourage the nonprofit sector by enhancing financial security, supplementing private 
donations, and causing less mission displacement (Anheier, 2005; Grønbjerg, 1993). 
Grant-Based Relationship Between State Government and NPOs 
Figure 1 shows similar trends in the percentage change in government grants 
awarded to the five most populous states from 1995 to 2007. The percentage change in 
government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations was generally between 20% and -
20%, except in 2000. However, the extent of the percentage change differed across states. 
For example, the amount of government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations 
significantly decreased from 1998 and 1999, hit its bottom in 2000, and increased again 
in 2001. The amount of government grants in Illinois and New York started to decrease 
by -75.05% and -35.73% respectively from 1998 to 2000. The amount of government 
grant in Texas, Florida, and California started to decrease -55.77%, -30.73%, and -
56.34% respectively from 1999 to 2000. Government grants awarded in all five states 
drastically increased between 2000 and 2001: 70.62% (California), 25.90% (Florida), 
53.75% (Illinois), 39.92% (New York), and 47.72% (Texas).   
 
 
 
49 
 
Figure 1. Percentage change in government grants awarded to nonprofits for the five most 
populous states and U.S. average 
 
In Figure 2, the percentage change in government grants awarded to nonprofit 
organizations of 50 states by region varied from 1995 to 1999. For example, in the 
Midwest area (which includes 12 states ND, SD, MN, WI, MI, OH, IN, IL, MO, IA, KS, 
and NE), government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations increased sharply from 
1995 to 1996 and subsequently followed similar trends with other regions. Interestingly, 
the percentage of government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations by region 
simultaneously decreased from 1999 to 2000, and simultaneously increased from 2000 to 
2001. After 2001, the variance of the percentage change of government grants awarded to 
nonprofit organizations ranged roughly within 0 and 40. For example, the percentage of 
government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations in the Northeast area increased 
more than those in other regions from 2002 to 2003 and decreased more that other 
regions from 2003 to 2004. 
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Figure 2. Percentage change in government grants awarded to nonprofits by region for 50 
U.S. states 
Note: Sourtheast region includes AR, MS, LA, AL, TN, KY, WV, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, 
AL; Northeast region includes PA, NY, VT, ME, NH, MA, CT, RI, NJ, MD, DE; 
Southwest region includes AZ, NM, TX, OK; Midwest region includes ND, SD, NE, KS, 
MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, MI, OH; and West region includes WA, MT, OR, ID, WY, 
CA, NV, UT, CO, AK, HI.  
 
Theoretical Discussion 
 
Several theories attempt to explain the relationship between government and 
nonprofit sector. Two relationships between government and NPOs are specific to the 
provision of public goods, complementary and supplementary relationship (Boris & 
Steuerle, 2006; Young 2000 & 2012). I exclude the adversarial assumption, which refers 
to the check and balance relationship between the government and NPOs, since this 
relationship is close to the advocacy activities, and not directly related to the provision of 
 
 
51 
public goods. Young (2012) defined such relationships as complementary or/and 
supplementary. In a complementary relationship, NPOs support the delivery and 
provision of existing government services that might include education, health care, 
museums, symphony orchestras, libraries, parks, housing, community development, and 
overseas aid. In general, these NPOs are funded by the government sector, and 
government expenditures tend to relate directly to the financing of NPOs; in other words, 
as government expenditures increase, financing of NPOs also increases.  
In contrast, a supplementary relationship means that an NPO produces public 
services in lieu of the government. When the government begins to provide services, 
NPOs have less responsibility to produce them and thus experience lower demand. 
Examples of supplementary government-NPO relationships might include such activities 
as animal rescue, disaster relief, and environmental protection, as well as professional 
associations with social agendas, venture philanthropy organizations (e.g., the Robin 
Hood Foundation), public policy initiatives, private foundations (e.g., the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation; the Turner Foundation), or international nongovernmental 
organizations. In some cases, these and other public services not yet provided by the 
government may be voluntarily provided by individuals. In such relationships, as 
government expenditures increase, financing of NPOs decreases.  
Method and Model Specification 
Method and Observation 
The present objective is to assess whether state or federal government 
contributions to NPOs increase or decrease as state government expenditures increase. To 
address this question empirically, I apply a fixed effects regression model using Driscoll 
 
 
52 
and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors to analyze data from multiple observations of 50 
states over the period 2000–2011. In general, models can use fixed and random effects to 
control for certain fixed and unobserved intra-state characteristics, such as management 
style, historical and cultural differences, and geographical characteristics.  
Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors make it possible to control cross-state 
correlation issues, which fixed and random effects models generally ignore. Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) noted that certain unobservable factors might be shared both among and 
within states—for example, some states might encourage or discourage the activities of 
NPOs. Additionally, nearby states might be spatially correlated, or states might be 
affected by states that are politically or economically similar. Across the 50 states, there 
are 1,225 correlations (50 times 49 divided by 2) (Hoechle, 2007); these issues can be 
addressed using spatial correlation consistent (SCC) models (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). 
The present study focuses on NPOs that filed a Form 990 from 2000 to 2011 and 
reported gross receipts greater than or equal to $200,000 or total assets greater than or 
equal to $500,000 at the end of the tax year. Because the standards used to file Form 990 
changed multiple times between 2000 and 2011, this study adopts the strictest standard 
(2010) for consistency. In addition, the study includes large NPOs required to file Form 
990 but not 990-N, 990-EZ, or 990-PF (Table 11). This study focuses on large NPOs 
because of the high expenses to obtain and maintain grants (Grønbjerg, 1993), and 
organizations that receive government grants must undertake more complex and time-
consuming financial reporting tasks than those relying primarily on individual or private 
contributions (Anheier, 2005). For those reasons, large NPOs tend to be more capable of 
obtaining and managing government grants. 
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Table 11 Versions of Form 990 
Form to File Status 
990-N Gross receipts ≤⁡$50,000 
990-EZ Gross receipts < $200,000, and Total assets < $500,000 
990 Gross receipts ≥⁡$200,000, or Total assets ≥ $500,000 
990-PF Private foundation–regardless of financial status 
Source: Which forms do exempt organizations file? (Updated 8 February 2016) (IRS) 
Retrieved from https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/form-990-series-which-forms-
do-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in 
 
Models and Dependent Variables  
In this first model, the dependent variable is the total amount of state and local 
government grants awarded to state-based NPOs. Because no data are available for direct 
measurement of state government grants awarded to NPOs, I calculate this amount by a 
proxy variable. Specifically, to calculate the total amount of state government grants per 
capita, I subtract the amount of federal grants from the total amount of government grants 
to NPOs. I then divide the total amount of state government grants by the total state 
population.  
 
Model 1 
𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
= 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝜃1
+ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒⁡𝑜𝑛⁡𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝜃2
+ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡𝜃3 +𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃4
+ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃5 + 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃6
+𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃7 + 𝜀?̃?𝑡 
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𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑙⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
=
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑁𝑃𝑂𝑠 − ⁡𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙⁡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑡ℎ𝑒⁡𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Data on the total amount of government grants were retrieved from Form 990 data 
archived by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (IRS, 2015). 
In the second model, the dependent variable is the total amount of federal 
government grants awarded to NPOs in a given state.  
Model 2  
𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
= 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝜃1
+ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒⁡𝑜𝑛⁡𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝜃2
+ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡𝜃3 +𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃4
+ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃5 + 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃6
+𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐⁡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝜃7 + 𝜀?̃?𝑡 
 
To calculate this variable, the total amount of federal government grants is 
divided by the total state population (Model 2). Data on amounts of federal government 
grants awarded to NPOs were collected from USA Spending (2016). This variable does 
not include negative values.  
Dependent Variable for Model 2 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
=
𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙⁡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑡ℎ𝑒⁡𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡
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Amounts of state and local and federal government grant support to the nonprofit 
sector fluctuate, and patterns differ across states. Appendices 1 and 2 detail the 
percentage changes in state and federal government grants to NPOs in all 50 U.S. states. 
Figure 3 shows that the amount of state government contributions has fluctuated over the 
study period, and that the patterns differ across the 50 states. In contrast, the amount of 
federal government contributions has historically exhibited similar cross-state patterns 
(figure 4). 
 
Figure 3 Average State Grants Awarded to NPOs by U.S. States (2000–2011, %Δ) 
 
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the years from 2000 to 2011, and the vertical axis 
indicates the percentage change of state government grant funding to the NPOs 
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Figure 4 Average Federal Grant Funding Awarded to NPOs by 50 U.S. States (2000–
2011, %Δ) 
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the years from 2000 to 2011, and the vertical axis 
indicates the percentage change of federal government grant funding to the NPOs.
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Explanatory and Control Variables 
For the explanatory variable, the spending size of the state government is 
measured by the size of its budgetary expenditure as a proportion of the gross state 
product (GSP), as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑒𝑡⁡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒⁡
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠⁡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡
 
The control variables consist of numerous measurements dependent on the 
relevant factors such as state government expenditures, service field and organizational 
factors, nonprofit finance, and state characteristics (economy, politics, and demographic).  
Table 12 Variables and Literature 
Variable Literature 
State Government Expenditures  Young (2012); Carroll & Stater (2009) 
Service Field & Organizational 
Factors  
 
Salamon (1987); McCarthy (1994); Bremner 
(1988);  
Nonprofit Finance 
 
Calabrese (2011); Carroll & Stater (2009); 
Frumkin & Keating (2002); Hager (2001); 
Keating et al. (2005); Trussel et al. (2002); 
Tuckman & Chang (1991) 
State Characteristics  
(Economy, Politics, and 
Demographic) 
Hall (2006); Twombly (2003); Gittell & Tebaldi 
(2006); Prentice (2015); Keating et al. (2005) 
  
The service classification comprises of six distinct fields selected from the 
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE): art, culture, and humanities; education; 
health; human services; public and social benefit; and religion (The Urban Institute, 
2012). The distribution of government grants to NPOs differs across service fields. 
Because NPOs provide different services with distinct characteristics, it is necessary to 
control for the size of nonprofit sectors in relation to the service field (DiMaggio, 1987; 
Froelich, 1999; Lipsky & Smith, 1990; McMurtry, Netting, & Kettner, 1991). 
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Organizational factors such as income sources, spending sources, and financial health are 
used to measure the size of the NPO support from government (Anheier, 2005; 
Grønbjerg, 1993).  
Table 13 Data Sources 
Dependent Variable 
State and Federal 
Government Grants  
IRS 990 Form (2014); Federal Assistance Awards Data 
(FAADs) (2016) 
Explanatory and Control Variable 
Service Field  IRS 990 Form (2014) 
Organizational Finance  
IRS 990 Form (2014); Lam & McDougle (2015); Letts 
(1999) 
Political Characteristics  
Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner (2010, 
1998); Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993); Jordan & 
Grossmann (2016); Klarner (2013); McDonald (2016) 
Economic Characteristics 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2016); U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (2012, 2015); U.S. Census Bureau 
(2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2016) 
Demographic 
Characteristics 
Cooperation for National Community Service (2015); 
Jordan & Grossmann (2016); Klarner (2013) Kramer 
(1981); U.S. Census Bureau (2016) 
State Government 
Finance  
Urban Institute (2015) 
 
Nonprofit financial condition may lead to different sizes of government support. 
These financial ratios are used to measure the size of nonprofit financial stability: 
membership income ratio, asset-sales income ratio, and inventory-sales income ratio. 
Lastly, state economic, political, and demographic factors can affect the size of 
government support to nonprofit sector (Brown et al., 2012). For instance, a state’s 
economic condition may influence awards of state government grants to NPOs. In 
general, economically stable states tend to distribute greater amounts of state government 
grant funding, and there is evidence that median household income, unemployment rate, 
and poverty rate tend to influence the extent of government financial support (Bennett, 
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2012; Carroll & Stater, 2009; Joassart-Marcelli & Wolch 2003; Keating et al., 2005; 
Prentice, 2015). The economic factor comprises of unemployment rate (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2012), median household income (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), poverty 
rate (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), and the coincident index (Crone & Clayton-Matthews, 
2005; Stock & Watson, 1989). The higher coincident index shows the state economic 
health. Higher value shows more active state economy.  
A state’s political and demographic characteristics may influence the amount of 
government contributions to NPOs. Governments alter levels of financial support for 
NPOs according to their social and political agendas, ideologies, and priorities (Hall, 
2006, 2010). Or, governments are willing to support NPOs according to demand for 
public services, which may vary due to local demographic factors such as wealth 
distribution, volunteerism, population density, population growth rate, education level, 
age, and racial structure (Gamm & Putnam, 1999; Gittell & Tebaldi, 2006; Lincoln, 
1977; Prentice, 2015; Saxton & Benson, 2005; Skocpol, Ganz, & Munson, 2000; 
Twombly, 2003). Table 13 shows detailed data sources. 
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variables (Model 1 and 2) 
Total Observation (n = 600) 
50 States, 2000–2011 
Mean SD Min Max 
State Grants to NPO ($2011, 
millions) 80.67 154.43 -96.00 1153.08 
Federal Grants to NPOs ($2011, 
millions)  53.43 47.67 1.54 482.09 
State government expenditure 
(Total state expenditure/SGP) 
7.86 9.80 0.37 67.71 
Federal government expenditure 322.31 378.00 4.64 3341.82 
Gini Index (0 equality→1 
inequality) 
0.45 0.02 0.38 0.50 
Number of Art NPOs/NPO total 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.13 
Number of Education NPOs/totals 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.32 
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Table 14 (continued) Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Number of Health NPOs/totals 0.30 0.08 0.12 0.68 
Number of Human Service 
NPOs/total  
0.24 0.06 0.05 0.39 
Number of Social Service 
NPOs/totals 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.28 
Number of Religious NPOs/NPO 
total 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 
Number of employees (#) 0.47 0.17 0.10 1.19 
Number of NPOs (#) 0.31 0.35 0.01 1.77 
NPOs with gross receipts above $1M 
(%) 
1.32 0.73 0.09 4.99 
Membership income/total revenue 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 
Asset sales income/total revenue 0.02 0.04 -0.18 0.34 
Inventory sales/total revenue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Personnel cost/total expense 0.31 0.05 0.14 0.47 
Fundraising administration cost 
ratio 
(Fundraising cost/total expense) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Revenue diversity score (HHI) 0.38 0.14 0.01 0.74 
Governor non-majority party 
(0 majority party; 1 non-majority 
party) 
0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
State ideology score (Con→ Lib) -0.15 0.13 -0.65 0.35 
Voting turnout ratio (Vote for 
Highest Office/Voting Eligible 
Population) 
0.52 0.11 0.29 0.78 
Unemployment rate (%) 5.70 2.10 2.30 13.80 
Poverty rate (%) 12.27 3.24 4.50 23.10 
Coincident index (#) 146.29 18.66 98.08 227.45 
Volunteer hours per resident 
(hour) 
3.85 1.42 -3.91 13.74 
Volunteer rate (%) 0.30 0.07 0.09 0.56 
Population growth rate (Δ%) 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.04 
Population density (# per sq. mile) 188.89 253.51 1.10 1189.26 
College graduation rate (%) 25.43 4.79 14.83 39.10 
Age under 18/state total 0.25 0.02 0.20 0.32 
Age over 65/state total 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.79 
Black population/state total 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.39 
Native Indian/Alaska Natives/state 
total 
0.02 0.03 0.00 0.15 
* All values are rounded. 
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Results 
 The empirical results confirm that the size of the state government budget 
inversely relates to the amount of state government grants. According to table 15, for 
every 1% increase in state government expenditures relative to GSP, the state 
government funding awarded to NPOs per capita decreased by around $6. The size of 
federal government expenditures exhibits a negative relationship with the amount of state 
and local government grant awards to NPOs. For every 1% increase in federal 
government expenditures on grants relative to SGP, per capital state and local 
government funding awards to NPOs decreased by $.05. With regard to the service field 
variable, the state and local government contribution is not correlated with service field 
type except for faith-based religious NPOs.  
 With regard to organizational factors, per capita state and local government 
funding positively correlates with size of human resources, suggesting that nonprofits 
with a larger staff size tend to receive more grants than nonprofits with fewer employees. 
On the other hand, gross receipt size larger than 1million dollars positively influences the 
federal government grants. NPOs’ financial structures differently affect state and federal 
grant funding. State and local grant funding negatively correlates with membership 
income and personnel costs but positively correlates with inventory sales income. In 
contrast, federal government contributions positively relate to membership income and 
fundraising administration costs but negatively relate to inventory sales. Similarly, NPOs’ 
financial health also has different effects on state and federal contributions; specifically, 
revenue diversification positively relates to state grant funding, but negatively relates to 
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federal grant funding. State and local governments award more grants to nonprofits in the 
state where their governor is in the non-majority party (Klarner 2003).   
 Economic factors also have a statistically significant effect on both state and 
federal grant awards. As a state’s economy improves, state and local grant funding 
decreases but federal grant funding increases. It is worth noting that demographic factors 
exert differing effects on state and local and federal grants. In particular, state and local 
government contributions increase in states where the population density is higher, the 
population ratio of residents over 65 years is higher, and the population ratio of residents 
under 18 years is smaller. Federal government contributions increase in the states where 
the number of volunteer hours per resident is smaller, and the black and American 
Indian/Alaskan Native population is larger. In short, federal grants are more commonly 
associated with traditionally underserved populations. 
Table 15 Fixed Effects Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2  
 
State and local government 
contribution per capita 
($2011) 
Federal government 
contribution per capita 
($2011) 
 β S.E. β S.E. 
Explanatory Variables 
State government expenditure 
 (per capita: state 
expenditure/SGP;$2012) 
  -5.48 ** 2.25 1.67 * 0.92 
Control Variables 
Federal government expenditure (.01) -0.05 ** 0.02 0.04 *** 0.01 
Gini Index (0 equality→1 inequality) 145.61  312.41 -129.84  121.03 
Number of Art NPOs/NPO total -132.87  278.38 -73.79  66.67 
Number of Education NPOs/totals 77.71  134.11 -17.82  34.09 
Number of Health NPOs/totals 152.26  126.03 -26.65  43.90 
Number of Human Service 
NPOs/total  
51.75  143.48 -47.17  30.37 
Number of Social Service 
NPOs/totals 
-61.51  136.85 -15.52  43.14 
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Table 15 (continued) Fixed Effects Regression Results 
Number of Religious NPOs/NPO 
total 
680.28 ** 285.86 -180.70  143.18 
Number of employees (#) 113.24 ** 55.98 -8.24  9.24 
Number of NPOs (#) -128.66  111.75 3.26  31.09 
NPOs with gross receipts above $1M 
(%) -1.58 
 
8.29 5.08 
* 
2.85 
Membership income/total revenue -3788.61 *** 716.31 384.63 ** 148.93 
Asset sales income/total revenue -75.56 54.95 29.23  17.69 
Inventory sales/total revenue 1585.65 ** 748.07 -369.21 ** 157.08 
Personnel cost/total expense -143.05 * 71.40 -32.41  22.58 
Fundraising administration cost ratio 
(Fundraising cost/total expense) 662.32 
 
2014.35 3498.91 
*** 
987.41 
Revenue diversity score (HHI) 273.00 *** 37.10 -60.90 *** 11.60 
Governor majority party (0 majority; 
1 non) 17.57 
** 
8.11 -1.38 
 
1.92 
State ideology score (Con→ Lib) -13.36 18.45 -7.39  4.47 
Voting turnout ratio (Vote for 
Highest Office/Voting Eligible 
Population) 
41.19  44.27 -9.59  29.53 
Unemployment rate (%) -15.55 *** 3.03 -0.74  1.08 
Poverty rate (%) 2.99 1.78 -0.52  0.40 
Coincident index (#) -1.61 *** 0.38 0.48 ** 0.18 
Volunteer hours per resident (hour) 1.20 1.77 -0.69 ** 0.25 
Volunteer rate (%) 46.99 38.95 -3.62  12.41 
Population growth rate (Δ%) -241.00 203.24 113.86  155.59 
Population density (# per sq. mile) 1.43 *** 0.31 -0.28  0.18 
College graduation rate (%) -2.09 5.98 2.51  1.77 
Age under 18/state total -1045.18 ** 380.88 -218.41  170.49 
Age over 65/state total 40.76 ** 19.43 7.25  4.27 
Black population/state total -462.86 490.91 705.49 *** 167.94 
Native Indian/Alaska Natives/state 
total 
-1363.92  969.90 1183.28 *** 378.44 
Constant 10.42  -1.98   
*p <.10; **p <.05; ***p <.01  
 
Discussion 
 This research addresses the influence of state and federal government 
expenditures on state and federal grant contributions to NPOs. As previous studies of 
government grant awards have focused on specific cases or individual organizations or 
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states, their findings have not been generalizable. The present study focuses instead on 
the comprehensive and relative effects of a range of factors on state and government 
contributions.  
According to the results, states with small expenditures tend to award more state 
government grants to nonprofits. This suggests that the grant-based relationship between 
state and local governments and local NPOs is supplementary—in other words, state 
governments with smaller expenditures award more grants to local nonprofits to produce 
the public services on behalf of state government, reflecting supplementation of nonprofit 
activity. On the other hand, nonprofits in the states with large expenditures tend to 
receive a lot of federal grants, which implies complementary grant-based relationships 
between federal government and NPOs. Local nonprofits tend to produce public services 
that state governments also produce when they receive more federal grants.  
 In addition, the characteristics of nonprofits significantly influence the amount of 
government grants. For instance, NPOs receiving state contributions also tend to 
diversify their revenue sources, expanding inventory sales. Those receiving federal 
contributions tend to simplify their revenue sources with recruiting a lot of membership 
fees. This result could also suggest that the volatility of state and federal grant funding 
may influence NPOs’ financial activities; specifically, state grant funding fluctuated 
during the study period (either increasing or decreasing), and these patterns differed 
across states (Appendix 1). This encourages NPOs that receive state and local 
contributions to diversify their revenue sources and to become larger employers, making 
them better able to withstand economic recessions or other external shocks that may 
affect state government funding. In contrast, federal grant contributions show a 
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continuous increase over the study period, and their distribution patterns are similar 
across states (Appendix 2). This growth stability allows NPOs receiving federal grants to 
focus on their grant programs and fundraising activities, placing less emphasis on 
diversifying revenue sources or expanding the organization.  
Since this study aims to analyze the comprehensive impact on government 
contributions, the results include some limitations. First, the use of the IRS Form 990 
confined the analysis to larger nonprofits. The study therefore excluded smaller NPOs 
that received state government grants. This disproportionate sample, however, could 
reflect reality better since large NPOs are better equipped to apply for and manage 
government grants. Another limitation is that the computation of state government grants 
used a proxy measure (total government contribution minus federal government grants) 
to estimate the amount of state government grants, as the IRS Form 990 does not identify 
the sources of government contributions.  
The study confirms that state government expenditures correspond to state and 
federal government grant awards to NPOs at the state level. It also explains the differing 
relationships between state and federal governments and NPOs, highlighting specific 
factors. Future research should investigate whether the government-NPO relationship 
differs by service field, and whether state expenditure on a given service field relates to 
government grant contributions for NPOs in that field.  
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Chapter Four. Coping with Economic Crisis: The Buffering Capacity of U.S. 
States for the Nonprofit Sector 
Dealing successfully with unexpected external shocks is crucial for the survival of 
organizations not only in the for-profit and governmental sectors but in the nonprofit 
sector as well. Unfortunately, compared to the number of studies on the private and 
public sectors, only a relatively small number of studies have examined the effects of 
economic crises on the nonprofit sector. Some of these studies on the nonprofit sector 
assume that economic crises negatively influence nonprofit organizations. For example, 
the 2008 economic recession resulted in a reduction of public and private funding 
available for nonprofit organizations, leading to the closure of programs, facilities, and 
even whole organizations (Cannon & Donnelly-Cox, 2015). On the other hand, the 
nonprofit sector may react differently to a recession by expanding its range of services or 
increasing the number of nonprofit organizations to respond to the increased service 
demands. A recession can result in the creation of more nonprofit organizations, although 
organizations established during a recession period are generally smaller in size, with 
fewer staff members, smaller budgets, greater reliance on volunteers, and a focus on a 
specific subfield, such as housing and homeless shelters (Wilhelm, 2010).  
Economic crises have occurred repeatedly in history. Two major recessions 
occurred between the years 2000 and 2012: in the years 2000–2002 and 2007–2008. The 
characteristics of these recessions are different from each other. The 2000–2002 
recession, also known as the dot-com bubble, was an economic bubble period caused by 
the extreme growth and subsequent failure of internet and information-technology 
companies. The growth of the internet and telecommunication business in the late 1990s 
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created large investment opportunities for individual investors, venture capitalists, and 
information-technology companies. The information-technology companies wanted to 
grow faster to increase their market power and expanded beyond their capacity with low 
interest rates. In addition, investors wanted to earn quick and large returns from the 
growing stock market. However, the stock market crashed in 2000 once the bubble had 
reached its peak (Glassman, 2015). After the sharp drop in stock prices, investors started 
to sell their stocks even at a loss and the companies concerned began to have liquidity 
issues (Goldfarb et al., 2007). The attacks of September 11, 2001 accelerated the market 
downturn. Many employees lost their jobs and only 48% of technology companies 
survived through 2004 (Berlin, 2008).  
On the other hand, the economic recession of 2007–2008, also known as the Great 
Recession (Blinder, 2015), was one of the worst economic crises since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The crisis began with a collapse of the subprime mortgage 
market in the United States. The bubble in the mortgage market grew due to excessive 
mortgage lending with low interest rates and risky loans encouraged by the government 
sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a result, the delinquency rate 
rose, which led to a devaluation of mortgage-backed securities and liquidity issues. The 
subsequent collapse of the mortgage market in the U.S. triggered an international banking 
crisis, involving the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers as well as the financial issues of 
major banks and financial institutes in Europe and Asia. The ensuing economic recession 
affected not only many individuals and domestic and international companies, but also 
the nonprofit sector.  
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This chapter aims to investigate the number of nonprofit organizations at the U.S. 
state level to clarify which factors regulate and adjust the influence of economic 
recessions on the nonprofit sector during the two economic crises of 2000–2002 and 
2007–2008. To test this research question, an empirical analysis was conducted on the 
nonprofit sector in 50 states as the unit of analysis using panel data for 2002 to 2012 
retrieved from Form 990. The empirical results contribute to the theory of nonprofit risk 
management and explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of its 
response to economic crisis.  
Literature Review  
Economic Recessions and Nonprofit Revenues 
Economic recessions can cause changes in financial support for nonprofits from 
individual donors, the for-profit sector, and the government. First, contributions to 
nonprofits from individuals change due to recessions. Gittell and Tebaldi (2006) 
suggested several factors that can influence personal contributions across states, 
including personal income, the marginal tax rate as the price of giving, and economic and 
demographic factors. Gittell and Tebaldi (2006) measured economic and demographic 
factors using variables such as average contributions, personal incomes, net capital gains, 
volunteering rates, educational levels, percentage of baby boomers (aged 35–54 years) in 
the population, and other control variables. Most of the data were for the years 2000 to 
2002. They concluded that baby boomers had limited discretionary capital to spend on 
charitable contributions during the 2000-2002 recession. Because baby boomers had been 
perhaps overly optimistic in the mid- to late-1990s about future economic conditions, 
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they were left with debts from purchases made during those optimistic yeas and thus had 
to reduce their giving during the 2000-2002 recession.  
Second, for-profit firms may also change their contributions to nonprofits. Total 
giving (the sum of direct cash, foundation cash, and non-cash contributions) from 95 
private companies decreased by 5% from 2006 to 2008 and increased 7% from 2008 to 
2009 (Rose, 2010, p. 12). Changes in non-cash contributions mostly drove the changes in 
total contributions from private companies. Non-cash contributions decreased by 
approximately 8% from 2006 to 2008 and increased by about 16% from 2008 to 2009. 
Cash contributions marginally decreased from 2007 to 2009. Other researchers have also 
concluded that there was an increase in charitable contributions from private companies 
during the 2008 recession (Brewster, 2008; Urriolagoitia & Vernis, 2012). Corporate 
contributions may also shift to different nonprofit subsectors during a recession. 
According to Cohen (2009), corporate philanthropists strategically gave more to the areas 
closely related to their businesses, such as community development, public image, brand 
awareness, and consumer allegiance. However, they reduced contributions to certain 
fields such as the arts and culture, nonprofit housing, and community development 
nonprofits.  
 Lastly, economic recessions can also affect the support from government, 
resulting in changes to nonprofit funding restrictions, for example. Carlson et al. (2010) 
found that the 2000-2002 recession expedited performance-measurement reform in 
Oregon, which affected the eligibility of nonprofit organizations for financial benefits. 
Due to the 2000-2002 economic recession, Oregon’s general budget of $14 billion was 
cut by around $2 billion. As a result, the Oregon legislature required the Oregon Progress 
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Board to develop performance-measurement guidelines that required nonprofit 
organizations to meet statewide goals. These expanded and intensified performance-
related restrictions caused drastic change in funding sources for nonprofits in the state. 
This example from Oregon suggests nonprofits’ support from governments may decrease 
during recessions. 
Responses of Nonprofits to Economic Recession  
 In addition to the change in nonprofit revenue sources, the recession influenced 
the financial behavior of nonprofit organizations. Calabrese (2012) concludes that 
nonprofit organizations reserved unrestricted net assets, rather than restricted assets, 
during the recession period. In general, nonprofit organizations retain unrestricted net 
assets to protect themselves against financial vulnerability. For example, the health and 
housing subsector tends to maintain its unrestricted net assets to pay debts, or they are 
required to have a certain unrestricted net asset balance as a reserve, rather than having 
leverage. However, nonprofit organizations in the education subsector reduce unrestricted 
net assets faster than leverage is acquired. This may indicate that leverage is a cheaper 
financing source for nonprofit organizations in the education sector. Although the 
reaction of nonprofit organizations toward financial shock varies by subsector, nonprofits 
generally increase unrestricted net asset accumulations to decrease their financial 
vulnerability.  
 Prentice (2015) also stresses the importance of liquidity reserves in responding to 
financial shocks. He used variables such as the ratio of working capital (the difference 
between current assets and the sum of liability and restricted net assets) to total assets and 
months of spending (the number of months an organization could survive after losing all 
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current income and maintaining its spending on operations at a constant level) (Bowman, 
2011, p. 179).  Previous research has found that these variables are negatively related to 
financial vulnerability (Bowman, 2011; Keating et al., 2005; Prentice, 2015). The more 
liquidity nonprofit organizations have, the less financially vulnerable they are.  
Regarding fixed and unfixed revenue sources, the earned income and assets of 
nonprofit organizations can be important variables to use in measuring the influence of a 
recession. Many studies have shown that income and asset levels are negatively related to 
financial vulnerability, whereas the ratio of net income to total assets is positively related 
to financial vulnerability (Bowman, 2011; Keating et al., 2005). In other words, 
organizations with larger asset reserves and smaller net incomes and revenues are less 
vulnerable to financial shocks, whereas nonprofit organizations with smaller asset 
reserves and larger net incomes and revenues are more vulnerable to financial shocks 
(Prentice, 2015).  
Specific types of revenue sources can make nonprofit organizations vulnerable to 
economic downturns (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Grønbjerg, 1993; Kingma, 1993). For 
example, nonprofit organizations that receive more than half of their funding from 
donations and contributions experience higher revenue volatility than those that rely more 
on commercial revenue (Carrol & Stater, 2009; Keating et al., 2005; Prentice, 2015). This 
is because contributions and donations are sporadic and heavily dependent on economic 
and political conditions (Keating et al., 2005).  
In addition to the types of revenue sources, the diversity of revenue sources is also 
an important factor that influences financial vulnerability and revenue volatility. In 
general, nonprofit organizations with few revenue sources are more vulnerable to 
 
 
72 
economic recession than those with diverse revenue sources (Calabrese, 2011; Carroll & 
Stater, 2009, Frumkin & Keating, 2002; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Hager, 2001; Keating 
et al., 2005; Trussel et al., 2002; Tuckman & Chang, 1991).   
Hypotheses and Variable Specification 
Previous studies focus on the impact of economic recessions on nonprofit 
revenues. However, few studies have explored the impact of nonprofit size (Saxton & 
Benson, 2005; Grønbjerg & Paarlberg, 2001). For the state and public, it may be more 
important whether the role of nonprofits is shrinking or not during the economic 
recession. For instance, the state could find that the nonprofit sector grows more even 
though their revenue fluctuates from the economic recession. As long as nonprofits play 
their role as the producers of social value, the state could make decisions on supporting 
the nonprofit sector to keep them producing social benefits.  
To examine the factors that influence the size of the U.S. nonprofit sector during 
economic recessions, I test the following two hypotheses:  
H1. The 2000–2002 economic crisis reduced the change in the number of 
nonprofits; 
H2. The 2007–2008 Great Recession reduced the change in the number of 
nonprofits. 
This will be accomplished by examining various studies that have focused on the impact 
of the economic crises on the nonprofit sector from the following four perspectives: 
nonprofit finance, nonprofit organization, state demographics, and state characteristics. 
Figure 5 illustrates the research framework. 
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Figure 5. Research framework 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I explore factors affecting the growth rate of the 
number of nonprofits. The dependent variable of this model is the change in the number 
of nonprofits. Explanatory variables are classified into three different categories: state 
characteristics, nonprofit finance and organization, and state demographic characteristics. 
State characteristics include variables such as citizen ideology, government ideology, 
governing party, legislative control, and volunteer rate (Berry et al., 1998 & 2010). 
Nonprofit finance and organization includes variables such as average revenues, 
functional expenses, liabilities, and net assets. Demographic characteristics include state 
gross product, poverty rates, percentages of white and black population, percentages of 
the population over 65 years old, and college graduation rates (Bielefeld, 2000; Bielefeld 
et al., 1997). 
Model Specification and Data 
The present objective is to investigate the number of nonprofit organizations at 
the state level to clarify which state factors mitigate or intensify the influence of an 
economic recession on the nonprofit sector. To address this question empirically, a 
pooled ordinary least squares regression model is applied to analyze data from multiple 
Recession Nonprofit Sector
Organizational Perspective
Financial Perspective
Managerial Perspective
Political Perspective
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observations of 50 states over the period 2000–2012 The present study focuses on 
nonprofits that filed a Form 990 from 2000 to 2011 and reported gross receipts greater 
than or equal to $200,000 or total assets greater than or equal to $500,000 at the end of 
the tax year. Because the standards used to file Form 990 changed multiple times 
between 2000 and 2011, this study adopts the strictest standard (2010) for consistency. 
The data cleaning follows the rule suggested by Bowman, Tuckman, and Young (2012).  
Empirical Results 
Descriptive Findings  
Table 16 provides the descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analysis. 
The total number of observations is 600, covering 50 states over 12 years from 2000 to 
2011. Each state has 15,460 nonprofits on average. Each nonprofit earned on average 
around $71 million and spent around $66.2 million on functional expenses. An average of 
around 30% of a state’s population tends to participate in volunteer activities, spending 
around 38 hours on average per year on these activities (Cooperation for National 
Community Service, 2015).  
Table 16 Selective Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of NPOs 600 15,460.17     17,458.98         750       88,700 
Citizen ideology (Con→Lib)* 600 51.824 15.897 8.450 95.972 
Volunteer rate (%) 600 0.300 0.066 0.085 0.558 
Volunteer hour (hour) 600 38.543 14.168 0 137.400 
Nonprofit Revenue (million$) 600 71.0 25.6 17.9 246.0 
Nonprofit Functional 
Expense(million$) 600 66.2 23.1 16.0 141.0 
Nonprofit Liability (million$) 600 59.3 36.4 10.6 258.0 
Nonprofit Net Assets (million$) 600 81.5 36.7 29.0 273.0 
* Citizen ideology was measured on a scale of 1 to 100, in which 1 represents an 
extremely conservative ideology, and 100 represents an extremely liberal ideology’. 
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Estimation Results 
Model 1 in Table 17 shows that the 2000-2002 stock market downturn and the 
2007-2008 financial crisis affected the number of nonprofit organizations slightly 
differently. First, the change in nonprofit size, measured by the number of nonprofits, 
decreased from 2003 to 2011 compared to 2000. The 2000–2002 economic crisis did not 
reduce the number of nonprofits immediately. However, the impact of the 2000–2002 
economic crisis continued from 2003 to 2005. In 2003, the nonprofit size decreased 
around 32% from the previous year. Nonprofit size decreased slightly in 2004 and 2005, 
5% and 4% respectively. On the other hand, during the 2007 Great Recession period, 
nonprofit size greatly decreased around 10% in 2007 but recovered quickly in 2008 and 
2009. Nonprofit size increased around 1% in 2008 and 35% in 2009, compared to 
previous years. After the recession, the nonprofit size decreased again in 2010 and 2011, 
6% and 7% respectively.  
Models 2 and 3 also show similar trends with the full model. The 2000–2002 
economic crisis did not immediately reduce the number of nonprofit organizations during 
the recession period in 2001 and 2002. Rather, nonprofit size was significantly reduced in 
2003. The decrease in nonprofit size continued until 2005. On the other hand, the 2007–
2008 Great Recession hit the nonprofit sector immediately in 2007 but the sector grew 
immediately in 2008 and 2009. Unlike the full model, Model 3 shows the increases in 
nonprofit size in 2010 and 2011 are not statistically significant.  
In addition, Models 1, 2, and 3 consistently show that the influence of the 
economic crisis on nonprofit size can be mitigated in states with the following 
characteristics: more state spending, more liberal citizen ideology, higher volunteer rate, 
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lower volunteer hours, higher net asset of nonprofit organizations, higher state gross 
product, lower unemployment rate, and more white and age above 65 population.  
Table 17 Economic Crisis and the Number of Nonprofit Organizations 
Dependent Variable 
Model 1 
(Full) 
Model 2 
(2000−2005) 
Model 3 
(2006−2011) 
ln(Number of NPOs) β t β t β t 
Year          
2001 −.073  −1.79 −.025 0.26    
2002 .026  0.02 .094 * 2.74    
2003 −.295 *** −7.77 −.232 *** −0.26    
2004 −.347 *** −9.33 −.287 *** −1.97    
2005 −.385 *** −9.97 −.328 *** −1.97           
2006 −.373 *** −10.15       −     − 
2007 −.475 *** −13.71   −.105 ** −4.16 
2008 −.469 *** −15.01   −.097 *** −6.97 
2009 −.120 * −7.04   .141 ** 0.20 
2010 −.182 ** −7.53   .077  −0.05 
2011 −.248 *** −8.82   −.008  −1.39 
State Characteristics          
ln(State spending) .281 *** 7.77 .363 *** 7.00 .153 ** 3.74 
Citizen ideology (Con→Lib) .012 *** 12.63 .010 *** 6.34 .012 *** 10.50 
Volunteer rate (%) .795 *** 2.54 .837 ** 1.32 2.522 *** 2.29 
Volunteer hour (hour) −.005 *** −5.90 −.004 ***  −.008 *** −4.06 
Nonprofit Finance ($2011)         
ln(Average revenue) −.081  −0.40 .163 1.43 −.199  −0.81 
ln(Average functional expense)  −.098  −0.71 −.304  −2.72 076  −0.01 
ln(Average liability) .044  1.28 −.075 * −0.65 −.084 ** −0.12 
ln(Average net asset) .192 *** 3.26 .189 *** −1.95 .162 *** 2.36 
Demographic Characteristics          
State Gross Product (ln)1 .795 *** 14.60 .726 *** 7.36 .153 ** 12.48 
Unemployment rate (%)2 −.054 *** −6.94 −.085 *** −7.32 −.037 *** −5.24 
Poverty rate (%) .004  3.08 −.001  −0.04 .009  2.84 
White population (%) 1.045 *** 14.43 .966 *** 9.86 .767 *** 10.29 
Black population (%) .215  0.54 .236   .379 ** 1.12 
Age over 65 (%) .538 *** 3.41 .450 *** 3.73 5.791 *** 3.22 
College graduation rate (%) .005  2.05 .006  1.27 .007  1.57 
Constant −6.623   −5.885  −6.970   
N 600 300 300 
P > F .000 .000 .000 
R2 .960 .969 .958 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01  
Note: Reference year 2000 for Model 1 & 2; Reference year 2006 for Model 3 
 
                                                 
1 State Gross Product (SGP) ($million 2011) 
2 Extrapolation of the missing variable for 2000 and 2001 using backward forecasting with Moving 
Average 3 (MA3)  
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Discussion 
This chapter investigates the impact of two major recessions on nonprofit size, 
occurring between the years 2000 and 2012: in the years 2000–2002 and 2007–2009. The 
2000-2002 stock market downturn did not affect the nonprofit sector immediately, 
however, nonprofits continued to struggle after the recession period. One explanation 
could be that nonprofits took time to adjust to the domestic market changes to the growth 
of internet and information technology. Also, the continued domestic issues like 
September 11th attacks or stock market downturns could cause nonprofit size to continue 
decreasing. 
On the other hand, the Great Recession in 2007 and 2008 did decrease the 
nonprofit size immediately in 2007, the largest drop in the 2000s. However, nonprofits 
recovered quickly in 2008 and 2009. The Great Recession in 2007 and 2008 was initiated 
by the mortgage-based bubble. This recession was related to the moral hazard of lending 
and exacerbated by the increased connectivity of global financial market. In that sense, 
the impact of the Great Recession in 2007 and 2008 was extremely large on the loan-
based market, like real estate, securities, and stocks. The nonprofit sector immediately 
shrunk by the shocks of financial illiquidity in the market. The nonprofit sector grew 
more in 2008 and 2009 since the nonprofits usually do not rely on real estate assets. Also, 
nonprofits could provide more support for people who lost their housing during the Great 
Recession.  
In addition to the impact of economic downturns, the state buffering effect could 
mitigate the decrease in nonprofit size. For instance, a high state volunteer rate increases 
nonprofit size significantly. According to Twombly (2003), the two main factors related 
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to the increase of nonprofit organizations are regional culture and organizational density. 
He found that nonprofit organizations in regions with more moralistic and traditional 
cultures have higher entry rates than those in regions with more individualistic cultures. 
The higher volunteer rate could reflect the more group-oriented and participatory culture, 
which can lead to an increase in nonprofit size. Lastly, the financial security of the state 
government and nonprofits affect the size of nonprofits according to nonprofit finance 
factors and state demographic factors.  
The empirical results can contribute to the study of nonprofit market risk and 
explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of responding to an 
economic crisis. For future research, individual organizational level data could be used 
for more precise and specific information instead of aggregated state analysis. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to test whether different subsectors of nonprofit 
organizations react differently to an economic crisis.  
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Chapter Five. Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Future Directions 
 This dissertation, titled “Three Essays on Financial Collaboration in the 
Government and Nonprofit Sectors,” aims to explore the internal and external financial 
risks that nonprofit organizations need to manage to sustain long-term growth. These 
topics are multidisciplinary studies that apply theoretical concepts from corporate 
finance, public administration, and management into nonprofit study. Nonprofit financial 
strategy and revenue management are important considerations as nonprofits have 
different financial perspectives than for-profit organizations.  
 First, it is necessary to apply advanced corporate finance strategies with caution 
as the nonprofit sector has increasingly competed with the private sector, which has used 
advanced finance and risk management strategies for many years. Chapter 2 investigates 
the impact of catastrophic revenue loss on the nonprofit sector and portfolio revenue 
strategy. The results indicate that portfolio revenue strategies decrease the chances of 
catastrophic revenue loss. For instance, nonprofits with revenue sets that have negative 
correlations among those revenue sources can theoretically reduce the probability of 
nonprofits losing their revenues in a worst-case scenario.  
 This result can contribute to the literature on nonprofit finance risk management by 
applying corporate finance theory-driven measurement to the nonprofit sector. It can also 
help nonprofit financial managers consider their revenue portfolio to reduce extreme 
revenue risk. The major feature of a well-developed portfolio is the correlation among the 
revenue sources; therefore, it is important to analyze the determinants of the correlations, 
ideally discussing the negative revenue correlations to minimize the portfolio variance, in 
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future research. Also, regarding value-at-risk, further study can explore why certain 
nonprofit subsectors are better at adjusting extreme revenue loss than others. 
 Second, even though government support is generally known to be a stable and 
secure source of revenue for nonprofits, underpayments or late payments can place 
nonprofits in financially difficult conditions. For these reasons, studying changes in 
government grants awarded to nonprofits can provide useful information. Additionally, as 
government grants are becoming a more significant part of nonprofits’ revenues in terms 
of maintaining financial security and mission-oriented objectives, an exploration of the 
understudied topic of state and local government grants awarded to nonprofits is in 
demanded. Chapter 3 explores the state determinants that influence the amount of state 
and local government funding that is awarded to nonprofits. Results show that state 
government expenditures, and economic and demographic factors influence the state and 
local government contributions to nonprofits. For instance, nonprofits tend to receive 
more state and local government grants when they are located in states with fewer 
expenditures. This result implies that state governments utilize nonprofits as a 
supplementary provider of public services.  
 In addition, state and local governments make contributions to nonprofits when the 
state has more resources (e.g., lower unemployment rate) or higher demands (e.g., greater 
population over 65 years old). Nonprofits that have diversified revenue sources and 
higher membership income also tend to receive more state and local government grants. 
This result can contribute to the literature on the budgetary relationship between state 
governments and nonprofits as well as nonprofit revenue management. It also suggests 
that nonprofit managers may consider state characteristics in order to improve their 
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financial connections with state and local governments. State and local governments can 
also create the environments for utilizing nonprofits to supplement or complement the 
provision of state and local government services. It would be fruitful to pursue further 
research using more detailed, within-state information about government contributions to 
nonprofits. This further study can improve identification of the impact of state finance on 
the nonprofits.  
 Finally, the ability to successfully manage unexpected external shocks is crucial 
to the survival of the nonprofit sector. An examination of market risk management will 
be helpful to explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of its 
response to an economic crisis. Chapter 4 studies the impact of economic recessions on 
nonprofits between the years 2000 and 2012, especially between 2000-2002 and 2007-
2008. The 2000-2002 recession had a delayed impact, whereas the 2008-2009 recession 
had an immediate impact on the nonprofit sector. This result implies that the size of the 
nonprofit sector could respond differently depending on the change in markets. In 
addition, the impact of the economic crisis on nonprofit size can be mitigated or 
intensified, depending on the characteristics of the state and its nonprofits. This result can 
contribute to the literature on nonprofit risk management as well as reinforce the 
importance of a state’s characteristics. For future study, the nonprofit size can be 
measured with the nonprofits’ expenditures rather than the number of nonprofits. 
Nonprofit expenditures, however, can be driven by their revenue; it is important to 
carefully analyze the feedback loop between expenditures and revenue.  
 In sum, this dissertation holistically analyzes nonprofit internal and external 
financial management. To improve internal financial security, nonprofit organizations 
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can develop well-fitted revenue portfolios considering the interrelation among revenue 
sources. To improve external financial security, nonprofits can consider the political, 
economic, and demographic characteristics of their environments. Lastly, nonprofits may 
need to focus on the impact of economic change since their revenue streams can fluctuate 
depending on the changes in market. 
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Appendix A: Chapter 4 Economic Crisis and the Spending of the Nonprofit Organizations   
Dependent Variable Expense Government Grant  
Nongovernmental 
Grant 
Program Service 
Revenue  
Other Revenue  
 β z β z β z β z β z 
Year                
2002 −.007 −0.59 −.080  −1.37 .056  0.41 −.001  −0.10 −.116  −1.49 
2003 .196 *** 11.57 .013  0.22 .088  0.60 .194 *** 9.48 .292 *** 3.59 
2004 −.025 ** −2.02 −.083  −1.38 .044  0.31 −.020  −1.26 −.096  −1.20 
2005 −.019 
 
−1.61 −.113 * −1.89    −.008  
  
−0.06 
−.024 
 
−1.53 −.049 
 
−0.61 
2006 −.037 *** −2.99 −.158 *** −2.65 .030  0.21 −.037 ** −2.39 −.074  −0.94 
2007 .078 *** 5.99 −.060  −0.97 −.054  −0.38 .056 *** 3.41 −.055  −0.67 
2008 .089 *** 5.86 −.183  −0.32 −.069  −0.39 .072 *** 3.51 −.375 *** −4.06 
2009 −.117 *** −6.24 −.183 ** −2.59 −.077  −0.40 −.086 *** −4.59 −.140  −1.54 
2010 .019 1.10 −.140 ** −1.97 .060  0.29 .039 ** 2.05 −.083  −0.90 
2011 −.054 *** −3.07 −.211 *** −2.94 −.031  −0.16 −.058 *** −3.03 −.182 * −1.93 
Nonprofit Finance 
($2011) 
 
 
       
  
  
 
 
ln(Average 
functional expense) 
 
 
 .491 * 1.83 −.714  −0.97 
.301 *** 
4.81 .243 
 
0.65 
ln(Average 
governmental grants) 
.015 
*** 
2.66    −.021  −0.27 
−.021 *** 
−3.09 .025 
 
0.65 
ln(Average 
nongovernmental 
grants)  
.003 
 
0.15 −.120  −2.39    
.051 * 
1.71 −.100 
 
−0.76 
ln(Average program 
service revenue) 
.116 
*** 
2.68 −.514 ** 0.28 .233  0.38 
  
 −.035 
 
−0.11 
ln(Average other 
revenue) 
.013 
* 
1.78 .010  −1.95 .086  0.99 
.000  
0.04  
 
 
Lagged dependent 
variable  
.795 
*** 
16.66 .873 *** 32.29 .079 ** 2.07 
.697 *** 
15.77 .716 
*** 
 
Nonprofit 
Organization 
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Average number of 
employees 
.000 
*** 
4.72 .001 ** 2.16 .001  1.30 
.000 *** 
3.90 .000 
 
0.37 
ln(Average liability) 
($2011) 
 
 
    −.012  −0.16 
  
  
 
 
ln(Average net asset) 
($2011) 
 
 
    −.147  −1.36 
  
  
 
 
Demographic 
Characteristics  
 
 
       
  
  
 
 
Population density 
(mi2) 
−.000 
 
−0.44       
−.000  
−0.70 .000 
 
0.10 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
.004 
* 
1.86    −.003  −0.15 
  
  
 
 
Poverty rate (%) −.002 ** −2.02       .002  1.52    
White population 
(%) 
−.015 
 
−0.68    .458 * 1.84 
−.007  
−0.23  
 
 
Black population 
(%) 
−.031 
 
−0.66    −.059  −0.15 
−.025  
−0.56  
 
 
Age over 65 (%) −.031 −0.80    −.068  −0.16 .013  0.27    
State Characteristics               
Citizen ideology 
(Con→Lib) 
 
 
 .001  1.13 .007 *** 3.08 
  
  
 
 
Government 
ideology 
 
 
 −.000  −0.16    
  
  
 
 
Governor party (Rep 
= 1) 
 
 
 .002  0.04    
  
  
 
 
Legislative control 
(Rep = 1) 
 
 
 −.023  −0.60    
  
  
 
 
ln(State spending) 
($2011) 
 
 
 .046 ** 2.01    
  
  
 
 
State Gross Product 
(ln)3 
 
 
   .119 ** 2.47 
−.002  
−0.35 .015 
 
0.61 
                                                 
3 State Gross Product (SGP) ($million 2011) 
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Volunteer rate (%)     .692  1.14       
GINI      2.115  1.06       
Constant 1.133   3.246   20.745   −.515   1.196   
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01  
Note: Reference year 2001; Lag year 2000 
 
Using functional expenses as the size of nonprofits, the results shows that the influence of economic crisis can be mitigated in 
states with the following characteristics: more nonprofit organizations with government grants, program service revenue, and other 
revenue (rent income or investment income), higher unemployment rate, and a larger number of employees in the nonprofit 
organizations. Since revenue and expenses in the nonprofit sector simultaneously influence each other, this research applies the 
simultaneous analysis model with five equations.  
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑥⁡ 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑦⁡ 
where revenue = government grants + non-governmental grants + program service revenue + other revenue.  
1. Spending = government grants + non-governmental grants + program service revenue + other revenue + x  
2. Government grants = spending + y1 + z1 (non-governmental grants, program service revenue, other revenue) 
3. Non-governmental grants = spending + y2 + z2 (government grants, program service revenue, other revenue) 
4. Program service revenue = spending + y3 + z3 (government grants, non-governmental grants, other revenue) 
5. Other revenue = spending + y4 + z4 (government grants, non-governmental grants, program revenue)  
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